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VITAL INTERESTS AND THE LAW OF GATT:




The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT'") "was
negotiated on the basis of reciprocity and mutual advantage [and] is
characterized by great flexibility in its provisions, especially those re-
lating to exceptions from the general rules, of measures that may be
taken in case of extraordinary difficulties and of those for resolving
conflicts between the Contracting Parties." 2 Although 40 years of
practice and 7 rounds of trade negotiations 3 in particular have added a
substantial degree of specificity to its rules, this observation is still a
valid description today.
GATT deals with a technical matter - the regulation of transna-
tional trade. It follows that most of its exceptions deal primarily with
"technical" problems caused by imports or exports of goods. 4 Articles
XX and XXI of GATT deal with a different kind of situation. The
former grants the Contracting Parties a reserved area of sovereignty in
some core domestic subject-matters, e.g., the protection of public
morals, protection of human, animal and plant life, health, and protec-
tion of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value.5
t This is a revised and shortened version of my LL.M. thesis at The University of Michigan
Law School. I am particularly indebted to Professor John H. Jackson, Hessel E. Yntema
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School for his helpful comments and
suggestions. I also greatly benefited from comments by Eric Canal-Forgues, Ilona Chayne, Janet
MacLean, Casper Zellweger, and last but not least, my articles editor at the MICHIGAN JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Clint Cameron. I dedicate this article to my American friends who
gave more than I was able to return.
* Assessor iur; LL.M., Michigan 1990. The author is currently a Research Fellow at the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, Federal
Republic of Germany. From 1989 to 1990 he was an assistant to Professor John H. Jackson at
the University of Michigan Law School.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTI].
2. International Fruit Company, 18 E.C.R. 1240 (1972).
3. See J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 52 (1989).
4. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 535 (1969). For an
excellent study of GATT article XIX, see M. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES
IN MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS (1985).
5. See generally K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION (1970).
GATT Article XXI
Article XXI, the subject-matter of this paper, reads as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any Contracting Party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security inter-
ests; or
(b) to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions; or
(c) to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action in pursu-
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the Mainte-
nance of international peace and security.
Even compared to the broadly tailored exceptions of article XX, arti-
cle XXI, and in particular XXI(b)(iii), strikes the reader as coming
rather close to granting a carte blanche to the Contracting Parties of
the "constitution of world trade' 6 to strip off any legal bonds imposed
on them - leaving them free to apply the rules as they wish. By doing
so, article XXI is reminiscent of the so-called "vital interests" clause
which essentially negates the international legal order in times of dis-
tress.7 For this reason, this paper will focus on article XXI(b)(iii)
which is the part of the security exception that has played a considera-
ble role in the practice of GATT. Due attention will also be given to
the other provisions of paragraph (b) and to paragraph (a). Because of
the particular problems Chapter VII and other pertinent parts of the
UN Charter pose, the intriguing intertwining between GATT and the
UN Charter must be left out of the analysis in this article.8 This anal-
ysis will examine whether the perception of article XXI as set forth
above is correct or whether the other provisions of GATT, the law of
treaties and general public international law command a different out-
come. In other words, this article will ask to what extent article XXI
6. See J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 30.
7. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986
I.CJ. 14, 220 (June 22,) (Oda, J., dissenting); Partsch, Vital Interests in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 526 (1987).
8. For economic enforcement measures under UN Charter provisions see A. LOWENFELD,
PUBLIC CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1983); von Schenck, Das Problem der
Beteiligung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen, 29 ZErr-
SCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 257 (1969); see also
Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78
(1948) [hereinafter ITO Charter].
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allows Contracting Parties to escape obligations of GATT and to what
extent it should.
In answering this question, it must be kept in mind that the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not operate in a legal or
factual vacuum; it is part of the general system of legal rules governing
the relationship between States. Although international economic
law, perhaps more than any other area of international law, recognizes
the ever-increasing interdependence of States and thus the limited
meaning of State sovereignty,9 it must accept that State sovereignty
remains the basis of present-day international law. The security ex-
ception, being the Member States' sovereignty safeguard provision,' 0
reflects this recognition.
Article XXI has particular relevance in two factual settings: in the
first place, it allows Contracting Parties - in certain instances - to
use economic measures for political means in a way which would be
considered illegal under the regular regime of GATT. Although arti-
cle XXI has been invoked explicitly on only a very limited scale during
the 40 years of GATT application, the use of economic measures for
political purposes has been and will continue to be an important op-
tion of self-enforcement of what the acting State will consider its right
under international law. Moreover, given the prohibition on the use of
force and the weakness of international enforcement procedures, the
continued use of such measures even seems desirable from the perspec-
tive of the effectiveness of international law. "
Article XXI might, however, also be used in situations which are
the very result of the success of GATT's underlying policies of foster-
ing free trade: the comparative advantage of country A's industry
might threaten the existence of the pertinent industry in country B. If
country B considers the existence of this industry as essential to its
actual or potential security, article XXI might be considered the easi-
est way out of the discipline of GATT. This approach to article XXI
has been recorded at least once in the past.' 2 The link between the
9. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS 2 (2d ed. 1986).
10. See the pertinent discussions reported in GATT' Council, Minutes of Meeting held May
29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188 (June 28, 1985) at 4-5 (Restricted) and GATT Council, Minutes
of Meeting held July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191 (Sept. 11, 1985) at 41-42 (Restricted).
See generally M. VAN MEERHAEGHE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 124 (5th ed.
1987).
11. Doehring, Die Selbstdurchsetzung vdlkerrechtlicher Verpflichtungen, 47 ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VbLKERRECHT 44 (1987).
12. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held October 31, 1975, GATT Doc. C/M/109 (Nov.
10, 1975); Sweden - Import Restrictions on Certain Footware, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17,
1975), and GATT Doc. L/4250/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 1977).
[V/ol. 12:558
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existence of so called key industries, 13 their competitiveness and na-
tional security is a notion which has attracted considerable attention in
public debates in the West recently because of the perception of a di-
minished military threat. For example, during the debates and discus-
sions preceding the passage of the U.S. Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, influential Congressmen repeatedly
stressed the nexus between national security and the viability of cer-
tain national industries.1
4
II. VITAL INTERESTS AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS
A. The Need for Escape Clauses
Clauses allowing treaty-making parties to escape their obligations
under certain circumstances are as old as international law. Specifi-
cally, many treaties list circumstances in which the content of the obli-
gation is to be altered or not applied at all. The GATT contains
several such clauses, among the most specific, articles XVIII and XIX
dealing with government assistance in economic development and ac-
tions in emergencies respectively.
As a general concept, public international law has adopted the no-
tion that every treaty contains an implied condition that it will become
obsolete should a fundamental change of circumstances occur. t5 The
clausula rebus sic stantibus is still a part of international law, rooted
both in customary international law and in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT").16 Both concepts have in common
that they bring flexibility to the legal bonds imposed by a treaty and by
so doing encourage sovereigns to submit themselves to the discipline of
13. After all, the very first of the European Communities is founded upon the idea that
taking away the nation-States' (and particularly Germany's) competence to administer those key
industries on their own would be a prerequisite of peace in Europe. See J. MONNET, LES ETATS
UNIS D'EUROPE ONT COMMENCt 135 (1955).
14. See. e.g., the so-called Gephardt amendment, H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG.
REC. H2642, 10,375-484 (1987) and statements of Senator R. Byrd before the Senate Finance
Committee, Impact of Imports and Foreign Investments on National Security: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37, 43, 50-52 (1987); Threat of Certain
Imports to National Security: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
32-44 (1986).
15. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 332 (6th ed. 1963); Haraszti, Treaties and Fun-
damental Change of Circumstances, 146 RECEUIL DES CouRs (1975); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 336 (1987). See Free Zones
of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 156 (June 7) for an
example of a decision of an international tribunal.
16. In this sense the International Court of Justice perceives article 62 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties as a codification of this doctrine. Compare Fisheries Jurisdiction,
(U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 45 with L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 492-493 (2d ed. 1987) where the authors assert that article 62 has a more lim-
ited meaning.
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an international legal regime which might otherwise appear too bur-
densome. It is true that the vagueness of the doctrine of the funda-
mental change of circumstances and article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties potentially brings an element of
uncertainty and instability into the world of international treaty law.
However, their general acceptance is a clear indication of their neces-
sity and a reflection of the fact that the law must offer a limited
number of options to escape contractual obligations. Without such
options, treaties run the danger of being disregarded even more fre-
quently. Clear, albeit difficult to fulfill, escapes provide the necessary
"breathing space" for the exercise of State sovereignty. Moreover, the
need for a concept like the clausula is highlighted by the existence of a
similar or comparable concept in almost every major legal system of
the world. 
17
B. Vital Interests and Substantive Public International Law
The concept of vital interests goes beyond the escape clauses set
forth above. Like them, it is a function of the sovereignty of States. It
goes much further however: by invoking vital interests a State is
granted freedom from international legal rules (possibly including jus
in bello) when a particular set of circumstances touches its honor or
(potentially) its existence. The concept of vital interests thus makes
the binding force of international obligations subject to a unilateral,
discretionary decision of the State and represents, in its most pro-
nounced form, a contradiction to the understanding of international
law as law (i.e., a set of binding rules) amendable only by a specific and
pre-agreed upon procedure. The ability to change rules whenever they
hurt those whom they are to constrain is not the hallmark of a legal
order. 
8
In general international law, this extreme notion of vital interests
has disappeared. In particular, the use of force, which as set forth, is
at the core of this concept, has been subjected more and more to a
quite stringent regime. Under the UN Charter, several regional treaty
systems and under customary international law, the use of force is
prima facie illegal; 19 vital interests, or a just cause, are not, under cur-
17. E.g., the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschaftsgrundlage in the German Civil Law, and fun-
damental change of circumstances in the U.S. law of contracts.
18. Partsch, supra note 7, at 527.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 187 (June 22) concerning the customary law prohibi-
tion of the use of force; see also Franck, Who killed Art. 2(4), 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970);
Reismann, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
642 (1984); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963);
[Vol. 12:558
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rent international law, valid justifications for the suspension of treaty
norms. The use of force is legal, however, when employed for self-
defense in the case of an armed attack.20 As can be seen from this, the
underlying concept of the "inherent right" to self-defense is similar to
the theory underlying the notion of vital interests. However, the use
of force is a substantially tamed instrument of sovereignty and takes
due notice of the inherent limitations sovereignty faces in a way that
the vital interests clause does not.
C. Vital Interests and Dispute Settlement
Besides its role in substantive international law, the concept of vi-
tal interests substantially fashioned the procedural aspects of interna-
tional contractual relations. The "well known reservation in the 1903
Anglo-French treaty concerning vital interests, independence, honor
and third-party interest" 21 became a model for more than a hundred
treaty clauses which excluded from arbitration sensitive issues and, as
a practical effect, left it to the State to determine unilaterally if a par-
ticular dispute was fit to be submitted to final and binding arbitra-
tion.22 In this pure form, again, those clauses have by and large
disappeared today. However, the concept of vital interests seems to
have experienced a renaissance in several proceedings before the Inter-
national Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Several States, otherwise known for
their commitment to the rule of law, have clearly violated their treaty
obligations under the Statute of the International Court of Justice by
retreating from pending proceedings before the Court by invoking vi-
tal interests either expressly or impliedly. 23 Some commentators also
point to the domestic jurisdiction clause attached to several declara-
tions under Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice as an example of the continuing reluctance of States to submit
themselves to a rule of law administered by independent third
parties. 24
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
RECUEIL DES CouRs 455 (1952); W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1961); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961);
see also ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 2(2) Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 32 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Schindler & Hailbonner, Die Grenzen des vdlkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbots, in 26
BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESSELLSCHAFr FOR VbLKERRECHT (1986); see also Schachter,
The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984).
21. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986
I.C.J. 31-32, para. 43 (June 22) (Oda, J., dissenting).
22. Partsch, supra note 7, at 527.
23. See Statement of Iceland in the Fisheries Jurisdiction case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 7
(Feb. 2); for the events in the Nicaragua case see 24 I.L.M. 246 (1985); see also Nuclear Tests
(Aus. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
24. The United States and the Soviet Union have proposed that all permanent members of
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III. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND
ITS SECURITY EXCEPTION
The General Agreement is the first and only global and compre-
hensive international treaty dealing effectively with transnational
trade. 25 In principle, it covers trade in every category of goods and its
membership is not limited to a geographically close or economically
homogeneous group of States. It is obvious that a treaty system, in
which almost two-thirds of all States take part,26 has a need for a pro-
vision like article XXI, which allows escape from treaty obligations for
non-economic reasons.
When interpreting this provision, one has to keep in mind that it is
part of an international agreement governed by the law of interna-
tional treaties. Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties27 does not directly apply to the GATT,28 its provisions reflect to a
large extent the well-established rules of customary public interna-
tional law relating to the interpretation of treaties. 29 Thus, an analysis
of a treaty provision may begin with an overview of the pertinent pre-
paratory work 30 and the history of its application;31 GATT practice
the UN Security Council should adhere to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
on the condition that whenever a State felt that questions of vital interests would be touched, it
could withdraw from jurisdiction. Only the United Kingdom spoke against this proposal which,
according to its view, was a step backwards. World Court Plan Meets Difficulties, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1990, at 9, col. i.
25. For possible forerunners, including the Treaty of Utrecht, see J. JACKSON, supra note 3,
at 30.
26. On January 11, 1991, Macao became the 101st Contracting Party to the GATT. 78
GATT NEWSLETTER 1, 8 (1991).
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 [hereinafter VCLT].
28. VCLT, art. 4 contains the principle of non-retroactivity in the law of treaties.
29. VCLT, arts. 31-33 were accepted without any opposing vote or abstention, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 39/1 l/Add.l, at 57-59. For pertinent international decisions see, e.g., Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, at para. 94
("may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the sub-
ject."); Beagle Channel Arbitration, [Argentina v. Chile], 17 I.L.M. 634, 646 (1978) ("In accord-
ance with the traditional canons of treaty interpretation now enshrined in the [VCLT] .... ). Cf
Bernhardt, Interpretation in International Law, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
318 (1984); A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES V6LKERRECHT 490 (3d ed. 1984); I.
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON TREATIES 114 (1984); Ress, Wechselwirkungen zwis-
chen VoIkerrecht und Verfassung bei der Auslegung v6lkerrechtlicher Vertrdge, 23 BERICHTE DER
DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 1 (1982).
30. See J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 20-22 for the particular relevance of the preparatory
work in the interpretation of GATT.
31. It is undisputed that, even under a strict article 32 VCLT approach, the structure of
VCLT section 3 (Interpretation of Treaties) does not command a canon-like approach, beginning
with textual interpretation and followed by the various other methods of interpretation as listed
in the VCLT. See de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 RECEUIL
DES COURS 1, 43 (1978); see J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 35 n.2, for the relationship between the
ITO drafting history and GATT.
GA TT Article XXI
also strongly suggests this approach.32
A. Preparatory Materials
The very first drafts of a Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization ("ITO") recognized that the proposed far-reaching regula-
tions needed exceptions for times of emergency in order to be
acceptable to potential signatory States. As the subsequent drafts of
this Charter are the direct historical precursors to the GATT,33 their
record constitutes an important part of the General Agreement's pre-
paratory work.
Besides a specific security exception relating to commodity ar-
rangements, the London draft34 contained emergency provisions pri-
marily dealing with injuries caused by increased imports. Article 66
provided, inter alia, that "[t]he conference may, by the affirmative
votes of two-thirds of its Members determine criteria and set up proce-
dures, for waiving, in exceptional circumstances, obligations of Mem-
bers undertaken pursuant to this Charter."' 35 Any question or
difference of opinion concerning the interpretation of the Charter or
arising out of its operation were to be referred to the Executive Board
in accordance with article 86(2). The Executive Board, then, had the
choice of either deciding the matter on its own, or referring it to arbi-
tration.36 It was also established that any ruling of the Executive
Board was to be referred to the Conference at the request of an imme-
diately affected party, or, in cases of general relevance, by any
Member.
Rulings of the Conference were to be appealed to the International
Court of Justice if they related to commercial policy or the specific
security exception of chapter VII (dealing with inter-governmental
Commodity Arrangements) and then only insofar as they presented a
justiciable issue.37 During the deliberations of the first report,38 sev-
eral delegates expressed the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Organi-
zation should be final in administrative matters coming within its
province "and that only legal issues should be referred to the courts,
32. See E. CANAL-FORGUES, L'INSTITUTION DE LA CONCILIATION DANS LE CADRE DU
GATr 495 (1990).
33. See J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 20-22.
34. Report of the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment, October 1946, at 33, UN Doc. E/PC/T/33 [hereinafter London
Draft].
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id. at 41.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 26.
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politico-economic decisions being recognized as the Organization's
own responsibility.
'39
At the London meeting of the drafting committee its members saw
a close relationship between a substantial security exception and its
provisions relating to a dispute settlement procedure. Considerable
discussion took place on whether appeals to the International Court of
Justice from rulings of the Conference on justiciable issues should be
subject to the consent of the Conference. The prevailing view was that
an affirmative vote of one-third of the Members of the Conference
should be the prerequisite for an appeal to the ICJ in most matters;
however, the U.S. position to allow appeal in any matter concerning
security was unanimously endorsed.4°
By the New York meeting of the drafting committee, the text al-
ready contained provisions serving the purpose of what is now GATT
article XXI, scattered in article 37(c)-(e), article 45 and article 59.41
Article 37 read as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a man-
ner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in Chapter V shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: .....
(c) Relating to fissionable materials;
(d) Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(e) in time of war or other emergency in international relations,
relating to the protection of the essential security interests of a mem-
ber....
The preparatory Conference delegates recognized that "some latitude
must be granted for security as opposed to commercial purposes" and
that "the spirit in which members of the Organization would interpret
these provisions was the only guarantee against abuse."'42
Then, one year after the initial proposals for an ITO Charter, arti-
cle 94 of the Geneva draft contained an equivalent to article XXI.43 It
39. Although it was generally agreed that the Executive Board should be able to refer dis-
putes to specific commissions for preliminary reports, disapproval was voiced at the idea of com-
missions being formally regarded as courts of first instance. See supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
40. Id.
41. Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, January 20-February 25, 1947, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34/
Rev. 1.
42. U.N. Doc. E/PC/r/A/SR.33 (1947) at 33 (quoted in J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 749).
43. Report of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (1947) [hereinafter Geneva Draft].
[Vol. 12:558
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is clear that the consolidation of the various security exceptions was
intended to, and indeed did, broaden its application; the exceptions
contained in the former drafts had been applicable only to specific and
limited parts of the ITO Charter. Also, by separating the security ex-
ception from what is today GATT article XX, the initial clause of
article XX could not be used to protect against possible discriminatory
abuse since it required that actions not be a "means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination." 44 A commentary of the United States
Tariff Commission noted what it called the "complete freedom of ac-
tion" that existed under article 94.45 The Commentary then went on:
This article contains no provisions requiring Members to obtain the ap-
proval of the Organization for any action they take or refuse to take
under these exceptions, although it appears likely that charges that the
exception were being abused for protective or other purposes would re-
quire consultation under Article 89 and decision by the Organization
under Article 90 if the consultation should not result in satisfactory
settlement."
Indeed, articles 89 and 90 were supposed to apply to all operations
under or related to the charter. They were supposed to
constitute an overriding authorization for sanctions in any case even
though other particular articles of the Charter do not provide for them.
Apparently, moreover, sanctions could be imposed under article 90 in
addition to those specifically provided in other articles of the Charter.
These articles are a recognition that the Charter can be successful only if
all members cooperate in carrying out its spirit or objective as well as in
adhering to its detailed terms. They are recognition that various devices
are available or can be readily established to accomplish restrictions on
trade which would not be in conflict with the exact letter of the
charter. 4
7
Thus, even in this late phase of the negotiations, which were leaning
toward strengthening the "security exception," its use was by no
means supposed to be excluded from review under the regular dispute
settlement procedure, then based on articles 89 and 90 of the ITO
Charter, now articles XXII and XXIII of GATT.
44. See J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 742.
45. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, ANALYSIS: GENEVA DRAFT OF THE CHARTER
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 85 (1947).
46. Id. at 96. It will be recalled that articles 89 and 90 of the ITO Charter are the predeces-
sors of GATT articles XXII and XXIII, L e., the GATT dispute settlement procedure. See art.
90(1) Geneva Draft, supra note 43, at 53. The commentary went on to stress that article 89 of
the ITO Charter required Members to give sympathetic consideration to representations made by
other Members, not only regarding alleged failure to carry out specific obligations of the charter,
but also regarding any measure which might impede the attainment of the objectives of the
charter, even if they literally did not violate any substantive regulation. Only if these matters
were not satisfactorily adjusted in consultations were they supposed to be dealt with under article
90; see UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 89.
47. UNITED STATES TARIFF COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 89-90.
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Article 99 of the final ITO Charter ("Havana Charter") contains a
security exception largely identical to article XXI of GATT. It had
first been introduced at the Havana Conference by the U.S. delega-
tion48 and is even broader than the analogous provision of the Geneva
draft. The Cold War had broken out and the United States pressed for
acceptance of the provision, which it considered a prerequisite for rati-
fication 49 of the Charter.50 In the view of a contemporary observer,
the wording of article 99 "in effect was so broad, as to permit a mem-
ber to take almost any action it desired in the name of national secur-
ity and it provided therefore one of the broadest of all escapes in the
Charter. That it was readily accepted by the Conference is a commen-
tary on the times." 5'
Despite the strengthening of GATT's security exception during its
development, 52 it is worth noting that those deliberations did not affect
the understanding that the security exception, susceptible to abuse,
was to be subject to consultation, decision and control of legality
under the future dispute settlement procedure. Moreover, such a pro-
cedure only makes sense if there is something worth submitting to
legal assessment. This is not to underestimate the importance of polit-
ical arguments in consultations under what is now article XXII of the
GATT. While such arguments are often very important, considerable
lawyering is indispensable to the resolution of what is, after all, a legal
as well as a political issue. This is even more the case in a regular
dispute settlement procedure - even without the current quasi-judi-
cial function served by the panels now in place in the GATT - which
clearly involves the application of legal principles. 53 The drafters of
GATT must have therefore presumed that within such a procedure
the objective prerequisites for the invocation of a security exception
would be subject to review in principle. This perception was shared by
the dominant economic power of the day (i.e., the United States)
which was also the major protagonist behind the security exception.
48. See W. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE: AN
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF THE I.T.O. CHARTER AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE 141 (1950).
49. Ratification did not ultimately occur because of Congressional resistance. J. JACKSON,
supra note 4, at 32.
50. C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 183 (1949). Wilcox served as director of
the Office of International Trade Policy in the U.S. Department of State during the elaborations
of the U.S. position for the negotiations of the ITO Charter.
51. W. BROWN, supra note 48, at 142, 351-52.
52. J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 299.
53. Moreover, this has never been questioned in principle, not even by the United States
while trying to prevent a substantive review of its action taken under article XXI in the Nicara-
gua dispute. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held July 17-19, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/191
(Sept. 11, 1985), at 41 (Restricted).
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Furthermore, the U.S. analysis suggests the understanding that cases
might arise in which invocation of the security exception was legally
unjustified.
These notions underlying the development of GATT's national se-
curity exception are only partially reflected in the history of its appli-
cation. An analysis of the pertinent statements concerning article
XXI, in particular article XXI(b)(iii), shows the tendency of the Con-
tracting Parties to declare the provision to be an unqualified escape
clause. In substance, though, article XXI has been applied with reluc-
tance and only in reaction to what was perceived to be an internation-
ally wrongful act. The following section presents an overview of the
more important documented cases54 in which article XXI was
invoked.
B. Article XXI Applied
1. United States - Czechoslovakia
The first opportunity to test the scope and application of article
XXI arose as early as 1949. The United States had employed export
control licenses which prevented the export of certain goods from the
United States to Czechoslovakia which it justified as, among other
things, falling under article XXI. During the consideration of Czecho-
slovakia's complaint, the statements of the Contracting Parties' repre-
sentatives to the CONTRACTING PARTIES"5 follow two basic lines
of reasoning. 56 The United States and its allies interpreted article XXI
as a virtually unlimited escape clause, controlled only by the general
policy notion that the GATT system should not be undermined
through the use of the security exception. On the other side, the repre-
sentative of Czechoslovakia stressed the fact that article XXI was part
of a legal instrument subject to interpretation within the usual proce-
dure and was not a carte blanche for a Contracting Party to escape its
54. After consultations under Article XXII(l), the import embargo introduced by Peru
against Czechoslovakia in 1954 and the Peruvian decree which restricted trade with countries
having centrally planned economies were abrogated in 1967. Peruvian Import Restrictions Modi-
fication of I August 1967, GATT Doc. L/2844 (Sept. 13, 1967) (Restricted); see also GATT,
Analytical Index, Art. XXI-5 GATT Doc. Leg/2 (1989).
55. In accordance with GATI article XXV(I), the use of the term "CONTRACTING PARTIES"
in all capital letters refers to the group of Contracting Parties acting jointly.
56. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Third Session; GATT/CP.3/33 (May 30, 1949)
(Statement by the Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation); GATT/CP.3/38 (June 2, 1949) (Reply
by the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation); GATT/CP.3/39 (June 8, 1949) (Reply of the
Head of the Czechoslovak Delegation); see also J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 749. Despite the
extensive discussions over article XXI in this matter, it is not clear which part of the provision
was invoked. The GATT Analytical Index refers to article XXI(b)(iii), although the original
documents do not. The more appropriate provision would be article XXI(b)(ii).
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obligations. Thus, for example, the Czechoslovak delegate stressed
that the interpretation of the term "war materials" (used in article
XXI(b)(ii)) by the United States had been "so [extensive] that no one
knew what it really covered."' 57 To this the U.K. delegate replied that
"since the question clearly concerned article XXI the United States
action would seem to be justified because every country must have the
last resort relating to its own security."58
Though it may have been appropriate for the U.S. to have used the
security exception in this case, the formulations used are evocative of
the broadest meaning of the vital interests clause. In summing up the
discussions, the Canadian Chairman described the position of the
United States as follows: "The United States justified any discrimina-
tion which might have occurred on the basis of articles XX and XXI
and particularly on the ground of security covered by the latter." 59
This singular focus on the term "security (interest)" and the rather
complete disregard of the requirements set forth in article XXI(b)(i)-
(iii) is also reflected in another statement of the British delegate,60 in
which he first discussed the legal relevance of the prerequisites under
article XXI(b)(iii), and in particular the extent to which certain goods
could serve both military and civilian purposes. Despite the fact that
he started his analysis from a legal, rules-oriented position, he later
turned back to extra-textual (and contra-textual) arguments, indicat-
ing that the self-judgment of a State acting under article XXI(b)(iii)
was the only relevant element of the analysis.61 This opinion contra-
dicts the provision of article XXI which leaves the Contracting Parties
no such unlimited right, but rather grants competence to act only in
the cases listed under article XXI(b)(i)-(iii). 62 This is not to say that
those prerequisites were not present in this case, and it is clearly argu-
able that such a position would be legally sustainable. The point
worth noting is less that article XXI(b) had been invoked but rather
that it had been presented to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as be-
ing unfettered by preconditions in much the same way as article
57. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Third Session, GATT/CP.3/SR.22 (June 8,
1949), at 6 (request of Czechoslovakia for decision under Article XXIII).
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 8.
60. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Third Session, GATT/CP.3/SR.20 (June 14,
1949), at 3 (request of Czechoslovakia for decision under article XXIII).
61. "No country could deny, or be expected to deny, the right to exercise such control where
matters of national security were concerned." Id.
62. On June 8, 1949 the CONTRACTING PARTIES rejected the complaint of Czechoslo-
vakia. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCU-
MENTS Vol. II, at 28 (1952).
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XXI(a).6 3
2. Ghana - Portugal
Twelve years later, Ghana followed the interpretation given by the
United States and the United Kingdom to article XXI when it ex-
plained its reasons for restricting trade with the new Member Portu-
gal. However, in addition, Ghana made an effort to bring its action in
line with the text of article XXI by referring not only to the notion of
security interests but also to the objective prerequisites listed in article
XXI(a). It stated that the policy followed by the Government of Por-
tugal concerning its African territories had led to an emergency in
international relations under article XXI(b)(iii).
The thrust of Ghana's argument rested on the statement that "[i]t
should be noted that under ... Article [XXI] each Contracting Party
was the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential security inter-
ests." Under this view, there could be no objections to Ghana's deci-
sion regarding the boycott of goods as justified by its security interests.
Ghana also argued that a country's security interest may be threatened
by a potential as well as an actual danger, and that the situation in
Angola was a constant threat to the peace of the African continent.
By bringing pressure to bear on the Portuguese Government, the ac-
tions of Ghana might lead to a lessening of this danger and was there-
fore justified by its essential security interest. 64
3. United States - Cuba
Without expressly invoking article XXI, the United States in 1962
imposed a complete embargo on all trade in goods, which the Govern-
ment of Cuba notified to the GATT. 65 The embargo is still in place.66
63. Presumably on the basis of article XXV, the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted, on
September 27, 1951, a Declaration freeing both the U.S. and the CSSR from their respective
GATT obligations towards each other, CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, Vol. II, at 36 (1952).
64. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS, Supp. No. 12, at 196 (1961) (Accession of Portugal).
65. Committee on Industrial Products, Inventory of Non-Tariff Barriers, GATT Doc.
COM.IND/6/Add. 4 (Dec. 12, 1968) at 2-3 (addendum on specific limitations on exports and
imports).
66. See Food Security Act of 1985, Publ. L. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354, which specifies that the
President will not grant any cane or beet sugar import quota unless the country concerned certi-
fies that it does not import sugar produced in Cuba for re-export to the United States. See also
the statement of the American delegate to the Forty-Second session of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, stating that the embargo was maintained for national security reason, GATT Doc.
SR.42/l (Nov. 1986) at 12.
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4. Federal Republic of Germany - Iceland
On November 29, 1974, the governments of four German coastal
states put into force a ban on direct landing of fresh fish by Icelandic
trawlers. 67 The Federal Government had approved these measures,
which foreclosed Icelandic fresh fish exporters from a market which
up to then had accounted for a substantial share of Iceland's overall
exports to the Federal Republic. 68 While Iceland claimed that these
actions violated the GATT, the Federal Republic pointed out that Ice-
land's unilateral decision to enforce its claim to extend its fisheries
zone from 12 to 50 nautical miles and its clearly illegal disobedience
with regard to an unfavorable ruling of the International Court of Jus-
tice in the matter gave the Federal Republic the power to take such
action. 69 In its opinion, therefore, "the ban on direct landings was a
justified counter-measure fully in line with the general principles and
rules of international law. There was therefore nothing to support the
Icelandic Government's assertion that GATT provisions were applica-
ble and that they had been violated by the German Government. 70
Iceland replied that it did not agree with the German and ICJ legal
evaluation of its measures; furthermore, it questioned the view that the
German measures were in line with general international law: these
questions were in any event, "irrelevant, as the GATT could only be
concerned with the application or functioning of the General Agree-
ment and not with any other international principles. ' 71 Therefore,
"even if the extension of the fishery limits was contrary to interna-
tional law, the measures which had been taken against Iceland consti-
tuted a breach of obligations under the General Agreement which was
a law in itself."7
2
In a counter-reply, the German delegate took the position that if a
measure was a legally justified counter-measure under general public
international law, it could not be illegal under GATT. Focusing on
the relation between GATT and general international law, Germany
took the position that "[t]he General Agreement did not represent an
isolated legal system. Rather, it was embedded in the general rules of
international law. Otherwise, any State could constantly violate the
economic interests of its neighboring State which would be forced to
67. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held February 18, 1975, GATT Doc. C/M/103
(Feb. 18, 1975) at 14.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25).
70. GATT Council, supra note 67, at 15 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 16.
72. Id.
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renounce any counter-measure it wanted to take."'73
The case is particularly interesting on at least two grounds. First,
it highlights the relationship and the possible tension between general
public international law and the law of GATT. Second, it is surprising
that the Federal Republic went so far as to decline to accept the appli-
cation of GATT rules to a highly political dispute, thus even refusing
to use the possibilities offered by article XXI. One notes the reluc-
tance to discuss political disputes of such caliber in the technical world
of tariffs and trade.
5. European Community - Argentina
Between April 10 and 26, 1982 the European Community ("EC"),
Canada and Australia took measures suspending imports from Argen-
tina74 as a reaction to Argentina's armed attack on the Falkland Is-
lands.75 In a joint communication to the members of the GATT
Council, the European Community and its Member States, along with
Australia and Canada, stated that
(a) they have taken certain measures in the light of Security Council
Resolution 502;
(b) they have taken these measures on the basis of their inherent rights
of which Article XXI of the General Agreement is a reflection .... 76
Again, it is striking that countries using economic measures for polit-
ical purposes showed a great reluctance to base their claim of legality
on GATT. Article XXI is mentioned as a reflection of unspecified
inherent rights, quoting not coincidentally the formulation of article
51 of the UN Charter. It is on these inherent rights that the EC based
its action, and not on article XXI, which was mentioned almost as an
afterthought.
During the pertinent discussions of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES, several countries raised objections to the EC's refusal to sub-
stantiate its claim that the actions were covered by article XXI. In
particular, the Brazilian delegate criticized the EC as setting a danger-
ous precedent by not demonstrating that the requirements of article
73. Id.
74. See Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT
Doc. L/5336 (June 15, 1982) for a detailed listing of measures submitted by Argentina. See
Kuyper, Community Sanctions Against Argentina: Lawfulness Under Community and Interna-
tional Law, in ESSAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION, 141, 151 (D. O'Keefe & H.
Schermers eds. 1982) for a comprehensive study of the legality of the actions; however, article
XXI(b)(iii) again gets little attention.
75. See R. DOLZER, DER VbLKERRECHTLICHE STATUS DER FALKLAND-INSELN
(MALVINAS) IM WANDEL DER ZEIT (1986) for a concise and in-depth analysis.
76. Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, GAT Doc.
L/5319/Rev.1 (May 5, 1982).
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XXI were fulfilled; at the same time, he agreed with the position of the
EC that the definition of essential security interests, as a matter of
principle, was to be defined by the State invoking them.77 Other coun-
tries demanded that, as a minimum requirement for the invocation of
article XXI, a State should notify the Contracting Parties of the meas-
ures taken, according to the regular GATT procedures. 78 Still others
claimed that article XXI had an implied limitation of applying only in
cases of extreme urgency. 79 The United States emphasized that the
General Agreement left to each Contracting Party the right.to judge
what was necessary to protect its essential security interests "in times
of an international crisis." 80 In the view of the United States, this was
wise since no country would have participated in the GATT if in do-
ing so it would have given up the possibility of using any measures,
other than military, to protect its security interests.
As in the initial communication of the EC, its representative re-
peated that the actions against Argentina were based on inherent
rights, 81 thus implying that the proper foundation for the measures
taken were not in the General Agreement. The exercise of these rights
constituted a general exception to the GATT and "required neither
notification, justification, nor approval." The United States, the Euro-
pean Community and Canada stated over and over again that GATT
was not the appropriate forum for the discussion taking place. Vari-
ous other countries criticized this, especially the notion of natural
rights as invoked by the EC. Argentina stressed that, in its opinion,
"no Article of the General Agreement could be applied in such a man-
ner that it would be divorced from the General Agreement" and that
"there were no trade restrictions which could be applied without their
being notified, discussed and justified."1
82
As a consequence of these discussions, the CONTRACTING
PARTIES adopted a "Decision Concerning Article XXI of the Gen-
eral Agreement," in which some of the most extreme positions articu-
lated by the EC and its allies were rejected. In its operative part, the
Decision stated that
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, contracting parties should
77. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157 (June
22, 1982).
78. Id. at 11-12.
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 8.
81. Id. at 10.
82. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on June 29-30, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/159
(Aug. 10, 1982) at 15.
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be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken
under Article XXI.
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties af-
fected by such actions retain their full rights under the General
Agreement.
3. The Council may be requested to give further consideration to this
matter in due course.
8 3
It is worth noting that the Decision, in its preamble, expressly states
that recourse to article XXI might "affect benefits accruing to Con-
tracting Parties under the General Agreement." This is the wording
of article XXIII, which is the basis for the GATT dispute settlement
procedure.8 4 At the same time, the Decision recalls the importance of
article XXI as constituting "an important element for safeguarding
the rights of Contracting Parties when they consider that reasons of
security are involved... ."5 It is equally important to notice that the
decision contains no remark concerning the interpretation of article
XXI, the two-fold structure of article XXI(b) and the objective prereq-
uisites listed therein. Besides noting that article XXIII applies to ac-
tions under article XXI and that notification is required, the decision
leaves almost everything as obscure as it was before.
6. United States - Nicaragua
Beginning on May 1, 1985, the most recent, and in many ways the
most interesting case under article XXI arose. On that date, President
Reagan promulgated an Executive Order in which he found "that the
policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an un-
usual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States and... declare[d] a national emergency to
deal with that threat."'8 6 To cope with this situation, the President
prohibited all imports and exports to and from Nicaragua as well as
the provision of all related services. Nicaragua claimed that the U.S.
measures violated both the general principles and various specific pro-
visions of the GATT.8 7
Other delegates noted that it "was not plausible that a small coun-
try with small resources could constitute an extraordinary threat to
83. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATr, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS Supp. No. 29, at 23 (1981-82) (Decision of Nov. 30, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Decision].
84. Cf Meng, Streitbeilegung im GATT, 41 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFEN-
TLICHES RECHT UND VbLKERRECHT 69 (1981).
85. 1982 Decision, supra 83, at 23 (emphasis added).
86. United States -Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua -Communications from the United
States, GATT Doc. L/5803 (May 29, 1985) at 2 (Restricted).
87. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held May 29, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/188 (June 28,
1985) at 2, 4 (Restricted).
Spring 19911
Michigan Journal of International Law
the national security of the United States."88 Some other Contracting
Parties also felt that the measure was "disproportionate;" ' 9 they
stated that article XXI should only be exercised in light of other inter-
national obligations such as those assumed under the UN Charter.90
More importantly, the view was again voiced that resort to article
XXI should be qualified by the party invoking it. If the U.S. interpre-
tation of article XXI were to be accepted, any Contracting Party want-
ing to justify the introduction of certain trade measures against
another Contracting Party could simply refer to article XXI and de-
clare that its security was threatened in order to remain within the
bounds of legality. 91 The representative of India stated:
Under [Article XXI] only actions in time of war or other emergency in
international relations could be given the benefit of this exception.
Clearly, the two Contracting Parties in this case could not be said to be
in a state of belligerency. The scope of the term 'other emergency in
international relations' was very wide. [A] Contracting Party having re-
course to Article XXI(b)(iii) should be able to demonstrate a genuine
nexus between its security interests and the trade action taken.9
2
The representative of the EC stated, on the other hand, that article
XXI left to each Contracting Party the task of judging what was nec-
essary to protect its essential security interest.93 He added, however,
that this discretion would not mean that the Contracting Party would
have the ability to apply the security exception arbitrarily; the repre-
sentative did not elaborate on what the legal devices were to respond
to such arbitrary application.94 The United States maintained that the
measures taken fell squarely within the national security exception of
GATT. Quoting the first part of article XXI(b)(iii), its delegate em-
phasized that there was no basis for discussing the issue within the
framework of GATT since the Contracting Parties had no right to
question, approve or disapprove of the judgment of each Contracting
Parties regarding what is necessary to protect its essential security
interest.
After the initial discussions on the substance of the United States
claim that its actions were justified by article XXI, Nicaragua ad-
vanced on the procedural track. It formally requested consultations
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id. at 6-7.
90. In this connection, attention was drawn to UN Security Council Resolution 562, which
calls on all States to refrain, inter alia, from carrying out, supporting or promoting economic
actions which might impede the peaceful objectives of the so-called Contadora Group. Id. at 7-8.
91. See id. at 10, for the pertinent statements of the Czechoslovak delegation.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 13.
94. See id. at 14, for the remarks of the Icelandic delegate.
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with the United States under article XXII(1)95 and asked for the estab-
lishment of a panel to hear the dispute. 96 The United States initially
opposed both requests. While recognizing that the right to article
XXIII dispute settlement proceedings was not necessarily lost in all
cases in which article XXI was invoked, the United States asserted
that a panel had no power to address the validity of, or motivation for,
invocation of article XXI(b)(iii). 97 After long negotiations, the Coun-
cil finally established a panel to examine the complaint made by Nica-
ragua 98 and agreed to the following terms of reference:
To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, of the under-
standing reached at the Council on 10 October 1985 that the panel can-
not examine or judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation of
Article XXI:(b)(3) by the United States, of the relevant provisions of the
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-
ment and Surveillance and of the agreed Dispute Settlement Procedures
contained in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration, the measures taken by the
United States on 7 May 1985 and their trade effects in order to establish
to what extent benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agree-
ment have been nullified or impaired, and to make such findings as will
assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in further action in this
matter.99
The Report of the Panel, which was presented in October 1986,
will be analyzed in greater detail later; here it is of interest that the
Contracting Parties acknowledged again,10 0 albeit in a very tortured
way, that article XXI could not be read in isolation, and is part of a
legal text with which it must be reconciled. This principle of interpre-
tation is so well established both in the domestic legal systems of the
world °1 and in public international law'0 2 that it is somewhat strik-
ing that this implied acknowledgement took so much effort to work
out in spite of its political importance for all players.
95. United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doc. L/5847 (July 15,
1985).
96. GATT Council, supra note 53, at 41.
97. Id.
98. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held October 10, 1985, GATT Doc. C/M/192 (Oct.
24, 1985) at 5-6 (Restricted). The delegate of Nicaragua mentioned five months of difficult work
to reach agreement on the terms of reference; the American counterpart said that the terms of
reference had been "crafted" specifically for this case. GATT Council. Minutes of Meeting held
March 12, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/196 (Apr 2, 1986) at 8 (Restricted).
99. GATT Council. Minutes of Meeting held March 12, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/196 (Apr.
2, 1986) at 7 (Restricted) (citations omitted).
100. See 1982 Decision, supra note 83.
101. E.g., Federal Republic of Germany, Grundsatz der praktischen Konkordanz. The U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently held that different provisions of a legal text have to be
reconciled.
102. See Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 322; 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 251-256
(1970).
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7. Application for Economic Reasons: Swedish Shoe Quotas
While all of these cases involved action that was politically moti-
vated, there is at least one incident in which economic overtones did
play an important role. 0 3 This is not to say that "economic" and
"political" can be viewed as two distinct categories. Obviously, the
opposite is the case; thus the distinction is employed here solely to
demonstrate that the security exception might be used (or abused) for
purposes which have more to do with economic effects on the side of
the State invoking article XXI than with security considerations in the
conventional sense. This brings up questions as to what extent other
escape clauses of GATT limit the scope of article XXI.
In November 1975, the Kingdom of Sweden introduced a quota
system for certain footwear. 1°4 The Swedish Government declared
that the measure was taken in conformity with the spirit of article
XXI, stating that "the decrease in domestic production has become a
threat to the planning of Sweden's economic defence in situations of
emergency as an integral part of its security policy. This policy re-
quired the maintenance of a minimum domestic production capacity
in vital industries."10 5 Many Contracting Parties expressed doubts as
to the justification of these measures under the General Agreement.
Sweden ended its measures regarding leather and plastic shoes as of
July 1, 1977.106
IV. ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS
It should be recalled that the parts of article XXI primarily rele-
vant for this study read as follows:
103. While only the Swedish action relating to the import of shoes was raised in GATT fora,
the Arab oil embargo also clearly falls under this rubric. The main goal of the embargo was to
facilitate the pan-Arab policy at the time of destroying the state of Israel. Paust & Blaustein, The
Arab Oil Weapon: A Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 427 (1974). How-
ever, there were also clearly economic motives behind the actions of the Arab states. See the
comments of Ibrahim F.I. Shihata (the then Legal Advisor of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Eco-
nomic Development) in Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under Interna-
tional Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 592 (1974) ("It was time.., to act on the basis of economic
rationality only and to cutback their production to the limits justified by their economic needs.")
Kuwait, one of the primary actors in the embargo, was a Contracting Party to the GATT, and
Algeria, Bahrain and Qatar had accepted its de facto application. See TREATIES IN FORCE ON
JANUARY 1, 1974, at 33 (1974) (U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Pub. No. 8755).
While the issue was never formally addressed in an official GATT body, the legality of the action
under GATT was discussed in scholarly publications quoted above.
104. Sweden - Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250 (Nov. 17,
1975) at 1.
105. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held October 31, 1975, GATT Doc. C/M/109
(Nov. 10, 1975) at 8.
106. Sweden - Import Restrictions on Certain Footwear, GATT Doc. L/4250/Add. I (Mar.
15, 1977) at I.
[Vol. 12:558
GA TT Article XXI
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any Contracting Party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security inter-
ests; or
(b) to prevent any Contracting Party from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they
are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on
directly or indirectly for supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international
relations ...
Hence, while both article XXI(a) and article XXI(b) grant broad com-
petence to the Contracting Parties acting for security purposes, only
article XXI(b) sets forth particular prerequisites which must be met.
Both paragraphs, however, require that "essential security interests"
be at stake: article XXI(a) allows abstention from action in order to
avoid acting contrary to these interests; article XXI(b) allows action
which prima facie violates GATT in order to actively protect them.
For this reason, we will first turn to an analysis of this common ele-
ment of both article XXI(a) and (b) before examining the additional
prerequisites for legality under article XXI(a) and (b).
What are essential security interests? The answer which first
comes to mind is that this phrase is irrelevant:. articles XXI(a) and (b)
concern certain actions which the Contracting Party -invoking it "con-
siders contrary to" or "necessary for" these interests and thus brings
in such a broad discretionary element that the task of defining essen-
tial security interests may be a fruitless and purely academic exercise.
However, such a view would not pay due consideration to the need to
read article XXI as part of a legal text, especially as an exception to
the general rules of the GATT. It is well established in State practice
and in international adjudication, 10 7 that exceptions to legal texts must
be interpreted narrowly. Thus, any exception can only apply as far as
its wording read in context provides. Therefore, even if there is broad
discretion to determine if in fact an action is necessary for the protec-
tion of essential security interests, we first have to examine what the
parameters are which define the outer limits of the term "essential se-
curity interest."
As already set forth, the GATT is a technical instrument, and or-
107. See Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, GATT Doc. L/
6253 (Nov. 18, 1987) at 64-65, para. 5.1.3.7; European Economic Community - Restrictions on
Imports of Apples - Complaint of the United States, GATT Doc. L/6513 (June 9, 1989) for
examples of GATT Panel decisions repeating this generally accepted rule.
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dinarily not a political instrument providing a framework covering
State activities in general. One key to the success of GATT lies in the
very limitation of its task. Article XXI is alien to this: it brings the
politics of international disputes into the legal world of trade and busi-
ness and commands that - in some circumstances - the latter must
cede to the former. It is this background that must be kept in mind
when turning to the question set forth at the outset concerning
whether the essential security interests addressed in articles XXI(a)
and (b) cover the interests of States to keep and maintain viable impor-
tant industries and/or to save natural wealth for future generations.
Both pursuits are clearly within the core of a sovereign State's compe-
tence and governments that do not appropriately take care of these
issues fail to protect the long-term security interests of their States.
Indeed, in today's world every economic crisis beyond a de minimis
level entails political consequences which can affect the security and
welfare of the State and its population. 108
The "essential security interests" covered by article XXI, however,
focus on a different situation. They address the immediate political-
military conditions that a State deems important for its position in the
world which are outside the regular scope of GA TT. The preparatory
materials provide overwhelming evidence that the structure of the
GATT and the wording "security" used in article XXI reflect the in-
tention of the drafters, who saw in article XXI(b)(iii) an antithesis to
"commercial" escape clauses. t°9 Thus, it would be wrong to read arti-
cle XXI as coping with dire socioeconomic consequences ensuing from
the operation of GATT principles and policies.
The Swedish government in the Swedish shoe case,"l0 however, ar-
gued that the destruction of pertinent domestic industries caused by
consumer preference for cheaper foreign imports endangered Sweden's
capability to provide a credible military deterrent to potential aggres-
sors. While shoes are not likely to be a key factor in the battlefields of
the future, certain high-tech products"' and military basics like steel,
heavy machinery and food might be." l 2 Is this to say that these "se-
curity-relevant" interests are covered by the security exception? The
108. For extensive references to GATT's "economic" escape clauses see Jackson, The Puzzle
ofGA TT: Legal Aspects of a Surprising institution, I J. WORLD TRADE L. 131, 151-57 (1967); V.
MUHAMMAD, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE 170-92 (1958); R. HUDEC, DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987).
109. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR.33, at 33 (1947).
110. GATT Council, supra note 105, at 8.
111. See the Toshiba case in 1987, Hahn, Vdlkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland im Jahre 1987, 49 ZEITSCHRIF' FOR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND
V6LKERRECHT 520, 584 (1989).
112. See, e.g., CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
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answer to this question has to be negative: the GATT does not pre-
vent the Contracting Parties from buying purely military goods exclu-
sively, or nearly exclusively, from domestic producers."13 This is how
the United States and other States maintain their domestic national
producers of weapons. However, it is beyond the scope of article XXI
to ensure the viability of industries producing either "dual purpose"
high technology goods or goods, which, like shoes, are needed by the
military in times of emergency. The security exception stands in the
tradition of vital interests clauses insofar as it covers only cases of ac-
tual dispute between Contracting Parties and not the unwanted and
perhaps unforeseen security-relevant consequences of a liberalized
world trade. Having briefly reviewed the preparatory work of article
XXI, we know that the drafters intended to provide relief for only
actual and "political" security problems. This conclusion follows
from GATT's specific escape and emergency clauses dealing with eco-
nomic emergency situations which implicate pertinent specific long-
term security issues. It would be flawed reasoning to apply article
XXI to those emergency situations already covered by other provi-
sions and thereby neglect the distinct purpose the security exception is
supposed to serve.
Finally, viewing the problem with appropriate regard to GATT's
overall goal and purpose, it might be argued that economic interde-
pendence makes a country per se more vulnerable in its security status.
This vulnerability, though, is supposed to be, and in practice generally
is, mutual although discrepancies concerning its extent and depth ex-
ist. Viewed from a military perspective, this strategic vulnerability is
the price for increased economic prosperity. At the same time such
interdependence appears as one of the most important peace-keeping
functions of transnational trade. Having regard to GATT's bouquet
of exceptions, security for the purposes of article XXI cannot be un-
derstood as encompassing the safeguard of "vital" or "key" industries
if GATT is to offer stability and predictability. The 1982 Decision of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES concerning article XXI 114 impliedly
confirms these conclusions; the context in which this decision had
been taken (i.e., the armed conflict between the U.K. and Argentina)
indicates strongly that military/political security was meant. Other-
wise there would have been the possibility of indicating the departure
from the explicit wording of the text.
LECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 14, at 6 (1966) for Switzerland's reservation concerning agricul-
tural goods in its Protocol of Accession.
113. GATT, art. III, sec. 8.
114. 1982 Decision, supra note 83.
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The term "security interests" thus excludes the use of article XXI
for protectionist measures. The next question is how to separate those
cases from cases in which article XXI has been used appropriately.
Should the purpose of the measures taken be the test or should a more
objective test determine the "non-economic" nature of the measures in
question? A comparable task of differentiating "economic behavior"
from actions relating to essential State functions arises in the context
of State immunity. While it has been suggested that the purpose of a
State activity should determine its character as an act jure gestionis,
the modem restrictive approach to State immunity favors an objective
test. Only such acts which are not commercial by nature will benefit
from the privilege of immunity of acta jure imperii. Thus, for exam-
ple, section 1603 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act determines
that the commercial character of an activity is determined "by refer-
ence to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transactions
or acts, rather than by reference to its purpose."115
It is suggested that a comparable approach should be applied to
determine whether a trade-restricting measure is a priori excluded
from the benefit of article XXI. However, the element whose objective
character is supposed to be determinant cannot be the pertinent trade
measure as such. Rather, the context in which the measure in ques-
tion was taken should be considered. If, from the perspective of a
neutral observer, the prima facie violation of GATT fits into the ordi-
nary scheme of a "normal" protectionist measure, it cannot be covered
by article XXI. An "easy case" to illustrate this objective method of
assessment would be a complete embargo against another Contracting
Party, say, in the context of allegations of illegal behavior under article
2(4) of the UN Charter, as opposed to a selective embargo of certain
goods, where the pertinent domestic industry is declining.
V. INTERPRETATION OF GATT ARTICLE XXI(a)
Article XXI (a) uses truly all-embracing language. 116 According to
it, the obligation to furnish information - be it via the GATT secreta-
riat or directly - proscribed in several GATT provisions" 17 is made
subject to the judgment of the Contracting Party if the disclosure of
certain information is contrary to its essential security interests.
115. 27 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988).
116. See J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 748
117. As also ordinarily required by the principle of good faith application of an international
treaty.
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A. Consideration
The text of article XXI(a) contains certain limitations. The word
"considers" makes clear that a State acts illegally if it withholds infor-
mation on a whim and without appropriate consideration of the effect
of its action (i.e., by failing to meet its general treaty obligation to
apply the provisions of GATT in good faith)." 8 Absent a "smoking
gun," ' 19 however, it will be nearly impossible to show that a State
acted other than in good faith when it claims its action was necessary
in order to protect its essential security interests. Any normal govern-
mental decision-making process will meet that lenient standard.
Otherwise, the text poses virtually no limits to the discretion of the
party invoking it. The power to determine unilaterally if the forward-
ing of information is contrary to security interests is clearly vested in
the Contracting Party; the text does not provide an objective standard
of necessity. A Contracting Party thus has vast discretion to deter-
mine if an act affects its essential security interests. As long as these
interests are not in fact economic interests, and as long as there is
some factual basis for a bona fide' 20 perception of a pertinent threat,
the prerequisites for article XXI(a) would be met. A narrower inter-
pretation, desirable as it may seem from the perspective of protecting
GATT's overall stability, cannot be reconciled with the extremely
open-ended wording of article XXI.121
B. Information
The plain language of the text states that information can be with-
held only under the standards elaborated above. As remarkably broad
as this exception might seem, it is worth remembering that the duties
to inform under GATT clearly have the character of auxiliary duties,
being linked to primary and more important obligations. 22 The ex-
118. V. MUHAMMAD, supra note 108, at 176-79.
119. For example, through unauthorized publication of cabinet protocols or other rather
specious circumstances.
120. As to the applicability of the concept of bona fide, see infra note 172, and accompanying
text.
121. However, de Guttry, Some Recent Cases of Unilateral Counter-measures and the Prob-
lem of Their Lawfulness in International Law, 7 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 169 (1986-87), impliedly
takes a different view without giving any reasons. He expresses the opinion that some of the U.S.
measures against Nicaragua were not "absolutely necessary." Such an objective standard cannot
be derived from the unambiguous language of article XXI. Nor can the principle of good faith
provide such an objective additional standard for action under the security exception. The prin-
ciple of good faith can only provide a limitation to the discretionary power of the Contracting
Party acting. It is beyond its reach to impose, contrary to the text, an objective standard.
122. GAI', articles VI(6)(c), VII(l), X, XI(c), XII(4)(a), XVI(A)(l), XVII(4)(a)-(c) and
XIX(2). See also CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 26, at 210 (1978-79) (Understanding Regarding Notification, Consulta-
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tremely loose standard of article XXI(a) (i.e., the self-judgment of a
Contracting Party whether the fulfillment of treaty obligations might
be contrary to essential security interests) applies to those secondary
duties, and those alone.123
VI. INTERPRETATION OF GATT ARTICLE XXI(b)
A. The Concept of Article XXI(b)
While article XXI(a) deals only with the auxiliary duty to provide
information, paragraph (b) does not aim just at secondary duties but is
a potential escape from even the most fundamental GATT obligations,
including MFN and national treatment. In particular, the introduc-
tory sentence of article XXI(b) contains all-embracing language simi-
lar to that in article XXI(a). 124 However, the exceptionally broad
possibilities of article XXI(b) are not granted without qualification.
Not surprisingly, viewing the potential for unilateral and complete es-
cape from GATT, article XXI(b)'s use is restricted to three distinct
objective factual settings listed under (i) to (iii).
The scheme presented in article XXI(b)'s introductory sentence
goes further than article XXI(a) does: GATT takes back its jurisdic-
tion and stops governing relationships of the Contracting Parties nor-
mally within its province. It is a matter of course that such an
exclusion can only take place within strict parameters: otherwise,
GATT could not be understood as legally binding by any normal us-
age of the term. It will be shown that article XXI(b) indeed lists ob-
jective prerequisites considerably limiting its scope. Once these
prerequisites are met, though, article XXI(b) does not further restrict
the options available to Contracting Parties who choose to apply eco-
nomic measures for political purposes.
B. Article XXI(b)(i) - Fissionable Materials
Article XXI(b)(i) allows Contracting Parties to take actions relat-
ing to fissionable materials in order to protect their essential security
that would otherwise violate GATT. Fissionable materials are at the
same time ultra-hazardous and of great military and civil importance.
They form the basis of some of the most dangerous weapons 125 and
tion, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, adopted Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter 1979
Understanding].
123. See V. MUHAMMAD, supra note 108, at 176.
124. Refer to the preceding analysis for the definition of the two prerequisites "essential se-
curity interests" and (bona fide) "consideration."
125. See Schwartz, Controlling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United States,
20 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1988).
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are an important element for the supply of electric energy in many
countries of the world. Several legal documents deal with fissionable
materials and their use.126 While GATT does not go as far as to ex-
clude the whole group of goods and raw materials ab initio from its
application, it grants the Contracting Parties the possibility to restrict
pertinent trade whenever they feel their security requires them to do
SO. 127
C. Article XXI(b)(ii) - Traffic in Arms
As with fissionable materials, the ultra-hazardous quality of mili-
tary products does not suffice to exclude them completely from the
application of GATT. Still, in the same vein, article XXI(b) allows a
broad escape from GATT principles. Although one might already see
an interpretative problem concerning the meaning of the term "arms,"
this kind of difficulty is certainly more pernicious in the similar cover-
age of "traffic in goods and materials ... carried on directly or indi-
rectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment."1 28
Almost any good offered on the markets of the world might be used
for such a purpose. The discussions in COCOM 12 9 about the specific
status of some "dual-purpose goods" prove the difficulty of establish-
ing clear-cut, bright lines in this field. However, taking into account
GATT's overall purpose, a fair reading of this language requires that
the goods covered be a necessary element of a war-related activity and
have some sort of military character.
Most importantly, since article XXI(b) addresses the trade in these
goods, the markets, i.e., potential buyers and producers, must regard
these goods as possessing such attributes. This definition, rather brief
due to the secondary attention paid here to the issue, provides a suita-
ble rule for recognizing goods mentioned in article XXI(b)(ii). Be-
126. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. Protection from the various dangers of fissionable materi-
als is one of the main tasks of the International Atomic Energy Agency. See Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S No. 3873. For US
legislation, see The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120
(1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3232 (1988)).
127. See generally Wilch, GA T and the Half-Life of Uranium Industry Protection, 10 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 150 (1989).
128. GATT, art. XXI(b)(ii)
129. COCOM is the acronym for the Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls which was created in 1949. See Berman & Garson, United States
Export Controls: Past, Present and Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 834-42 (1967); Hunt, Multi-
lateral Cooperation in Export Control: The Role of COCOM, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285 (1983);
Murphey & Downey, National Security, Foreign Policy and Individual Rights: The Quandary of
United States Export Controls, 30 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 791, 805 (1981). See also B. CARTER,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME
65 (1988).
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cause of this, measures taken by Contracting Parties to enforce their
right under that article have only rarely been attacked.130 For exam-
ple, no serious legal arguments seem to have been advanced against
the practice of COCOM or the 1987 pact of industrialized countries to
prevent the spread of rocket technology usable both for civil and for
military purposes.1
3 1
D. Article XXI(b)(iii) - Actions Taken in Time of War
The third subsection, article XXI(b)(iii), which covers action
"taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations," is
the part of the security exception which has been of the greatest practi-
cal importance so far and has the greatest potential for future use and
abuse. As shown above, it has been invoked a number of times in the
past as the justification for actions violating prima facie provisions of
GATT. A key question for the understanding of this provision is how
its first and second part relate to each other. As has been shown, the
introductory sentence of article XXI(b) (which is the same for the
cases listed under (i)-(iii) grants wide discretion. It is evident from the
above discussion that in the cases of article XXI(b)(i)-(ii) this discre-
tion is only triggered if certain objective prerequisites are fulfilled. The
question then is whether the same is true for article XXI(b)(iii), i.e.,
are "war" and "other emergency in international relations" objective
standards or are they as open-ended as the first part of the provision,
thus allowing unrestrained escape?
1. War
Obviously the term "war" lends itself to manifold uses. Legal
scholars and State practice since ancient times have had difficulty for-
mulating a proper definition. ' 32 The search for its meaning in our con-
text, however, must not neglect that the term appears in an
international treaty dealing with inter-State relationships. Therefore
the term "war" is by definition a term of public international law, not
of domestic law. It is well established today that not every armed con-
flict is a "war" in the legal sense. Typically, war can be described as a
contention between States through armed force for the purpose of
130. See GATT Analytical Index, Art. XXI(2), GATIr Doc. Leg/2 (1989) (concerning the
challenge by Czechoslovakia in 1949 of the use of the article XXI security exception by the
United States).
131. See Hahn, supra note 111, at 599.
132. See Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 1-31 (1988) for a recent
attempt to do so.
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overpowering each other. 133 In order to distinguish war unequivocally
from peace, the definition of war must have recourse to the intentions
of the parties involved. 134 This intention might be derived from a for-
mal declaration of war, but it also can be deduced from the nature and
extent of the hostilites.
Does GATT then grant a Contracting Party who violates the pro-
hibition on the use of force a benefit by allowing it to escape from
pertinent treaty obligations? Such a construction, as convincing as it
may seem at-first glance, would attribute to GATT a role which this
technical instrument does not have: rather, when inter-State relations
have regressed to the law of the jungle (apart from the minimalia of
thejus in bello), the niceties of GATT have no role of their own. Put
differently, the GATT does not even pretend that it has any force in an
armed conflict, thus recognizing the limited role of international eco-
nomic law once States have decided to go to war.
2. Position of Third Parties
Although the preceding discussion focused on the relations of Con-
tracting Parties at war with each other, the more frequent scenario,
where a Contracting Party wishes to exercise economic coercion on
one or more parties to an armed conflict, does not differ in principle.
Article XXI(b)(iii) is no obstacle to economic coercion; the security
exception limits GATT's applicability to non-belligerent times, regard-
less of who is primarily involved in the conflict.
The previous sub-section of this article might not have produced
an exhaustive definition of the term "war," but such an attempt could
prove unnecessary in the face of the wording of article XXI. Escape
from GATT is legal in times of war and other emergencies in interna-
tional relations. The text thus makes clear that the use of the security
exception is not limited by a more or less narrow interpretation of the
term "war." Instead, every "other emergency" will entail the special
consequences of article XXI.
E. Article XXI(b)(iii)-Actions Taken in Times of "Other
Emergency in International Relations"
"Emergency" clearly is not a term of art commonly used in inter-
national law. The text of article XXI(b)(iii) suggests a preliminary
answer: "emergency in international relations" is not used as a stand-
133. See generally 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DispumTS, WAR AND NEU-
TRALITY 202-16 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
134. Meng, War, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (1982).
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alone term but as an annex to the term war. Thus we can assume that
at least one meaning of this term is "taken over" from the former. The
term "emergency in international relations" certainly then must cover
those hostile interactions between States which, although short of be-
ing a "war," constitute an armed conflict.' 35 One has to keep in mind
that at the time the GATT was drafted, the era of "undeclared wars"
had not yet fully begun.
Read more liberally, however, the text might leave us with another
option: the term "emergency in international relations" could have a
meaning going beyond the function of a terminological safety net
catching those hostile encounters which are not "war" for the pur-
poses of the law of GATT, making any malfunction or problem in
international relations a reason to escape GATT obligations.
An even more expansive interpretation might focus on the subjec-
tive element in the introductory half-sentence which allows the perti-
nent Contracting Party to judge what is necessary. If this subjective
element was seen as carried over in the next half-sentence, this would
entail a completely different view of the term we are analyzing: it
would then become a device for granting the Contracting Party invok-
ing the security exception the authority to define the notion unilater-
ally. This would distinguish "other emergency in international
relations" from the further provisions set forth under (i)-(iii). The
term would then not spell out an objective prerequisite, but an unlim-
ited discretionary margin, and thus transform article XXI(b)(iii) into a
"negative enabling clause," permitting any Contracting Party to es-
cape the application of GATT. This position deserves particularly
careful examination because it is to some extent reflected in several
statements of Contracting Parties in pertinent discussions in the Coun-
cil or in deliberations of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. None of
these parties has gone as far as explicitly stating that it is up to the
State invoking the security exception to determine what "emergency
in international relations" means. However, the position of not ad-
dressing that point, while at the same time focusing exclusively on the
"right to determine oneself when questions of security are involved" is
sustainable only if one of the two extensive interpretative approaches
set forth above prevails. 36
135. As already indicated, different international treaties define war differently according to
their respective purposes. See the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces on the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; see generally the documentation in A. ROBERTS & R.
GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR (2d ed. 1989).
136. A number of authors refer to article XXI as a self-judging provision: obviously this is
an adequate description of article XXI(a); insofar as article XXI(b) is concerned this statement
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1. Text
If one takes seriously the textual approach to a treaty as a starting
point for its interpretation - and article 31 of the VCLT suggests one
should - the broadest reading of the security exception set forth
above seems unsustainable. On the contrary, the text strongly sug-
gests that "other emergency in international relations" sets a standard
which the Contracting Party invoking article XXI(b)(iii) has to meet
and not to define unilaterally. This understanding would be parallel to
that of the other sub-sections of article XXI(b) which are all struc-
tured such that they grant (extraordinarily broad) discretion only if
certain objective prerequisites are met. The term "emergency" ex-
cludes from its scope ordinary strained relations between States; it im-
plies some sort of extreme conflict between States. Thus, a
preliminary interpretation reveals that "emergency in international re-
lations" encompasses every hostile interaction between States involv-
ing the use of force. In addition, it must be understood as covering
every situation in which the use of force would be legal. This result
follows a majore from the express permission to vacate GATT obliga-
tions in case of war. If even an aggressor could escape GATT in this
case, then a State having the right to act in self-defense must be freed
from having to grant trade benefits to its attacker. However, "emer-
gency in international relations" might cover additional situations not
necessarily involving the use of force.
The security exception's "legislative history" does not provide fur-
ther insight into its scope. As the earlier discussion has demonstrated,
this provision has been regarded as an extremely broad escape clause.
Regrettably, the history of the provision does not reveal exactly how
broad the escape-valve made available by article XXI was supposed to
be. It is clear, though, that the possibility of abuse was perceived but
was meant to be dealt with by the future dispute settlement proce-
dure. 137 This indicates that the drafters did see legal limits to the use
of the security exception. The list under article XXI(b)(i)-(iii) makes
it clear that this broad discretion was only supposed to exist in a spe-
reflects the extraordinary competencies of the Contracting Party acting under the security excep-
tion. The most thorough analysis of article XXI can be found in J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at
748, where he points to the dangerous possibility that article XXI(b) may be abused as a loop-
hole. The security exception is regularly described without any reservation as a self-judging
provision, citing as reference Jackson's analysis, although it is much more cautious than the
statements it is supposed to support. See Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of
the GA TT Dispute Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defense in the Context of the US. Em-
bargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 603 (1987). See also J. FAWCETT, INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC CONFLICTS: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 19 (1977) where he asserts
that "It]he Contracting Party is the sole judge of the use of exceptions under Article XXI."
137. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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cific set of enumerated circumstances. It would follow that "emer-
gency in international relations" is a term with a limited meaning and
not a norm granting, even de facto, unlimited competence to the State
invoking article XXI(b)(iii).
This dichotomy between discretion and safeguarding the GATT
legal system, reflected by the combination of objectified prerequisites
and discretionary competencies, would not fit with a reading of the
term "emergency in international relations" which would give the in-
voking party the power to define the term according to its own views
with basically unfettered discretion. This result would be achieved,
though, if "emergency in international relations" were to encompass
any kind of political tension between two Contracting Parties.
Furthermore, in the absence of persuasive indications to the con-
trary, it cannot be assumed that "emergency in international rela-
tions" is the only term listed under (i) to (iii) which does not describe
an objective factual setting. "Fissionable materials," "materials de-
rived therefrom, .... traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of
war," or "traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment," to
provide some examples, are objective terms of treaty law not alien to
the rest of the GATT. True, serious legal debate about the meaning of
the term "fissionable materials" or whether goods are supposed to sup-
ply military establishments might arise. Such questions, however, do
not seem more complicated than determining what "like products"
are, l38 or when "nullification and impairment"' 139 occur.
Most importantly, the term would lose any real purpose if it al-
lowed any Contracting Party to define an "emergency in international
relations" on its own whim. 140 In the absence of any strong exegetic
argument to the contrary, the wording indicates that the prerequisites
listed under (i) to (iii) have a distinct meaning of their own; that no
such qualifying terms are listed under article XXI(a) implies that the
list under (i) to (iii) was supposed to restrict the broad discretion
granted by the introductory sentence. This makes good sense: the
138. See, e.g., the Panel reports in CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 28, at 102 (1980-8 1) (Spain - Tariff Treatment
of Unroasted Coffee, adopted June 11, 1981) and Supp. No. 25, at 49 (1977-78) (EEC - Meas-
ures on Animal Feed Proteins, adopted Mar. 14, 1978).
139. See the references in GATT, Analytical Index, Art. XXXIII-19 - XXXIII-34, GATT
Doc. Leg/2 (1989).
140. For a pertinent example, see the interpretation of the term "unforeseen development"
(GATT article XIX) in the Hatter's Fur Case, CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, REPORT
ON THE WITHDRAWAL BY THE UNITED STATES OF A TARIFF CONCESSION UNDER ARTICLE
XIX OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 9-13 (1951) and J. JACKSON,
supra note 4, at 561.
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prima facie GATT violations addressed in article XXI(a) are of less
importance for the functioning of the GATT system and thus were put
in the unfettered discretion of the Contracting Party acting for secur-
ity purposes. The contrary is true for the primary obligations from
which escape is possible under article XXI(b)(iii). Also, the observa-
tion that article XXI does not just speak of deteriorating political rela-
tions or necessity in international relations - terms which would
definitely imply a much larger extent of discretion - supports this
understanding.
Thus, the wording of article XXI, read with due regard to its gene-
sis and purpose, does not allow interpretations of the terms "war" and
"emergency in international relations" as terms not subject to the ordi-
nary, i.e., norm-oriented and objective, meaning which are a hallmark
of the international treaty interpreted here.
2. The Systematic Environment of the Security Exception
Three elements buttress the preliminary result that the security ex-
ception is by far not the unrestricted way out of the system some Con-
tracting Parties have claimed.
a. System of GA TT Escape Clauses
"No international agreement.., can long exist without some pro-
vision, formal or informal, for relaxing legal norms in certain circum-
stances."1 41 The GATT contains an elaborate network of exceptions
which have led some distinguished observers to believe that "a lawyer
could drive a four-horse team through any obligation" it contains. 42
As broad as some of the exceptions may be, they are the only means
that GATT provides to individual Contracting Parties for escaping
obligations without approval of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
43
Together with some specific exceptions,'" like those relating to devel-
oping countries, 45 they allow the necessary flexibility in individual
cases to ensure the stability of the overall system. Except for the ob-
ject of this study, 146 none of these provisions grants the unilateral de-
parture of a Contracting Party from an unspecified number of rules.
141. J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 535.
142. Extension of Reciprocal Trade Act: Hearings on HR. 1211 Before the Comm. on Fi-
nance, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1263 (1949).
143. A different issue is involved when some of the vague provisions of GAT" do not always
clearly define the extent of eventual obligations and thus offer well-advised Contracting Parties
the possibility to "avoid" the burden free trade can mean for a national economy.
144. See J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 536 for a good overview.
145. K. DAM, supra note 5, at 225; J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 275.
146. And the singular provision of article XXXV, which allows the unilateral determination
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Rather, they allow unilateral departure from obligations only in very
specifically circumscribed factual settings. Article XXI(a) is not in
line with this general rule of exceptions within GATT, and it expressly
states so; article XXI(b), however, does not.
b. Waiver under GATT Article XXV(5)
By and large, article XXV(5) allows the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES to waive any obligation of GATT. Provided that a two-thirds
majority consents to the waiver, it may be granted either for an indi-
vidual case or for a specific category of "exceptional circum-
stances."' 147 This provision would be senseless if the meaning of
"emergency in international relations" were so vague as to encompass
any tension between States. It is true that there would still be the filter
of the "essential security interests" requirement. As demonstrated,
though, this is an extremely broad concept and even more difficult to
review post factum. As a practical matter, an exceptional circum-
stance for the purposes of article XXV(5) would always entail or be
the consequence of tightened relations between the Contracting Par-
ties involved.
c. The GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedure
Another factor which must be considered is the relationship be-
tween the security exception and the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dure which will be examined later in more detail. Here, it suffices to
acknowledge that article XXIII applies to actions under article XXI.
This is, in principle, undisputed 148 and put beyond practical doubt by
the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 1982.149 A char-
acterization of article XXI(b)(iii) as being a truly self-judging provi-
sion, then, would be a contradicto in adjecto.
of a Contracting Party not to apply GATT to a new Contracting Party. See J. JACKSON & W.
DAVEY, supra note 9, at 322 with references to U.S. practice.
147. The pertinent text of article XXV(5) states that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may
"define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting requirements shall
apply for the waiver of obligations." A majore, then, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may de-
fine such categories without changing the voting rules provided for in article XXV(5).
148. See GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157 (June
22, 1982) at 9; GATT Council, supra note 82, at 14; GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held
January 26, 1983, GATT Doc. C/M/165 (Feb. 14, 1983) at 18 (Restricted); GATT Council,
supra note 53, at 41-46; see also J. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 748.
149. 1982 Decision, supra note 83, at 23. Other than that, however, almost every relevant
detail determining the scope and substance of the relationship of the two provisions is unsettled,
in particular with regard to the quarrels relating to the installment of the Panel in the Nicaragua
Trade Measures case. As will be shown later, a correct understanding of GATT allows Panels to
review article XXI actions in substance, albeit according to the remarkably loose standard pre-
scribed by article XXI. Already now, though, we have to acknowledge that a text has to be read
in its entirety and that there is a reciprocal relationship between provisions.
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3. The Linkage to the Law of Reprisals
The examination of article XXI(b)(iii), based on the text, the con-
text, the overall purpose and the goals of the GATT reveals that the
term "other emergency in international relations" is a phrase with a
meaning of its own and not simply an extension of the first half-sen-
tence which grants largely unfettered discretion to the Contracting
Party acting under the security exception. Thus far, the analysis of
this article has delineated two parameters which describe the outer
limit of any possible interpretation: at one extreme, "other emergency
in international relations" certainly covers situations which include
military confrontation between Contracting Parties, without being
"war" in the classical sense. At the other, the security exception re-
quires that there be "something more" than purely strained relations
between Contracting Parties as a prerequisite of invocation.
This analysis raises substantial reasons for a narrower interpreta-
tion of the pertinent requirements for the exercise of article XXI,
while at the same time making clear that it was the very purpose of the
security exception to grant the Contracting Party invoking it a consid-
erable choice of action. Because article XXI(b)(iii) points at the term
"war," one has to conclude that "emergency in international rela-
tions" also refers to concepts of general international law. The phrase
"other emergency in international relations" clearly covers any factual
situation where, under general international law, the use of economic
sanctions would be possible despite any conflicting contractual obliga-
tions to the contrary. It can thus be assumed that this represents a
reference to the law of reprisals.' 50
It is a well established maxim of treaty-interpretation that any pro-
vision must be read so that it is not superfluous and fits into the overall
structure of the treaty as a whole. An understanding of "emergency in
international relations" as referring to the general international law
definition of situations in which economic sanctions are legal, despite
conflicting treaty obligations, would refer to legal concepts outside of
GATT - a technique already utilized by the first alternative of article
XXI(b)(iii).
This interpretation of the term "other emergency in international
relations"'' does not alter the result that article XXI(b) grants an
150. See 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 133, at 138, for the definition of reprisal; see generally
Leben, Les Contre-Mesures Inter-Etatiques et les Reactions d l'Illicite dans la Societe Internatio-
nale, 28 ANNUAIRE FRANrAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 9 (1982); E. COLBERT, RETALIA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1948); A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION:
LAWFUL BREACHES AND RETALIATIONS (1975); M. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND IN-
TERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT (1980).
151. See generally White, Legal Consequences of Wrongful Acts in International Economic
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amount of discretion as to both necessity and proportionality beyond
the rules of ordinary treaty-law. Because the purpose of the security
exception is to leave Contracting Parties considerable room for action
in "security matters," such leeway is necessary to avoid the legal con-
straints ordinarily imposed by GATT.
The important limitation which that interpretation entails is that
an action under article XXI(b)(iii) is only compatible with GATT if
the Contracting Party against which the action is directed has com-
mitted an international delict, i.e., either a violation of a treaty or a
customary law obligation. This limitation, however, is reconciled with
the purpose of the security exception. By establishing a qualitative
minimum threshold for a situation which triggers article XXI(b)(iii)
rights, the limitation fits with the overall function of the treaty-system
to provide stability. Indeed, the wording of article XXI(a) is evidence
of GATT's ability to spell out clearly when a function of GATT has to
cede completely to a Contracting Party's sovereignty claims. 152
The thrust of the security exception is to allow reaction to interna-
tionally wrongful acts in times of "international crisis" through eco-
nomic means unrestrained by non-discrimination principles. It should
be recalled that one of the major changes in the Geneva draft was to
eliminate the non-discrimination clause still found in article XX,
which reflects the fundamental principle of GATT not to discriminate
even in times of economic emergency. Article XXI(b)(iii) is designed
to exclude this usually peremptory principle. 153 Such a substantial de-
parture from a core GATT rule clearly shows the purpose of the se-
curity exception to ensure the Contracting Parties the possibility to
take effective counter-measures in security matters.
4. The Impact of GATT Practice
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in line
with customary international law,' 54 commands that the interpreta-
tion of a treaty take into account "any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application
of its provisions and any subsequent practice in the application of the
Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 137 (1985); Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRITISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 1 (1970); see G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHO'TT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED
(1985) for a comprehensive study of the effect (and success) of economic sanctions.
152. See supra note 140, and accompanying text.
153. See Koulen, The Non-Discriminatory Interpretation of GA TT Article XIX(I): A Reply,
1983/2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 87, 89; J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra
note 9, at 604; but see Bronckers, The Non-discriminatory Application of Article XIX GA TT: Fact
or Fiction?, 1981/82 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 35, 39.
154. See I. SINCLAIR, supra note 29, at 115.
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treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation." 1 5 The practice of the Contracting Parties does not re-
veal a pattern which would contradict the interpretation of that
provision set forth above. Rather, the practice seems to support the
notion that the security exception in article XXI(b)(iii) is subject to
specific and objective limitations despite some statements of the Con-
tracting Parties to the contrary. It is important to remember that
these contrary statements were made in a politically charged atmos-
phere; one would probably expect too much by requiring government
representatives to elaborate on whether the legal prerequisites of a pro-
vision have been met, in particular because their statements have no
immediate consequence. Be that as it may, whenever delegates have
expressed the opinion that article XXI leaves it completely to the deci-
sion of each Contracting Party to determine when it is proper to act
under article XXI(b)(iii), the CONTRACTING PARTIES have ex-
pressed neither tacit nor express consent.
An examination of the relevant cases156 shows that in every case
but the Swedish shoe case the party acting under article XXI(b)(iii)
was acting in retaliation to what it perceived to be illegal actions com-
mitted by the targeted State, most often the illegal use of force or vio-
lation of human rights. In each case, the claim was materially
substantiated. This has not always been stated in such terms in the
pertinent GATT fora, due to questions about the competence to deal
with the matter. Thus, it can be seen that the Contracting Parties'
actions have all been in conformity with the restrictive interpretation
of article XXI(b)(iii) as set forth above. It is the substantive content of
the Contracting Parties' behavior which forms the relevant State prac-
tice for the purpose of interpreting the security exception's material
content. 57 This clearly supports a restrictive interpretation of the
term "emergency in international relations"' 15 and not the completely
open-ended and discretionary approach occasionally put forth by
some States. The decision of 1982 relating to the dispute between the
155. See VCLT, supra note 27, at art. 31.
156. To the extent it relates to article XXI(b)(iii), the first Czechoslovak case reported deals
in effect with article XXI(b)(ii); see sources cited supra notes 56 and 57.
157. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 29, at 137.
158. This includes the Nicaragua case. The United States has consistently contended that
Nicaragua was violating the law of nations by threatening its neighbors and by not observing
minimum standards of international human rights in treating its own citizens. Although the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") held otherwise, it came to its conclusion without the aid of
the presentation of evidence by the United States which, in violation of article 36 of the ICJ
statute, walked out of the procedure. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Decision of Nov. 26 on Jurisdiction). Thus it cannot be
denied, to say the least, that the allegations of the United States were in fact pertinent.
Spring 1991]
Michigan Journal of International Law
EC and Argentina also points in the direction of a somewhat more
restrictive interpretation of article XXI(b)(iii). 159 Although the Decla-
ration contains no clear statement concerning the substantive law of
the security exception, the spirit of the Decision favors a cautious ap-
proach to the use of this potential Pandora's box. Although the plain
text may not show this, when viewed in the context of the EC-Argen-
tina case, there is rather little doubt that the position of the EC (un-
restricted use of article XXI(b)(iii)) had not been accepted. The same
is true for the Ministerial Declaration of 1982,160 which, while far
from being an example of extreme clarity, states that, "the Contracting
Parties undertake, individually and jointly ... to abstain from taking
restrictive trade measures for reasons of a non-economic chlracter not
consistent with the General Agreement." Despite this tortured lan-
guage, the text implies a considerable degree of support for a more
restrictive interpretation of article XXI(b)(iii): otherwise, the sentence
quoted would hardly make sense at all.
5. Position of Third Parties
Again the question arises whether and to what extent third parties
not being victim of an international wrongful act can escape GATT
obligations. This time, though, the solution is less obvious than in the
case of war. An international wrongful act (short of an armed attack)
committed against a friendly nation might certainly represent an
"emergency" for the purposes of an article XXI(b)(iii) analysis and,
accordingly, be perceived as contrary to a State's essential security in-
terests. However, the nexus between essential security interests and
the international wrongful act committed is less evident. The tacit as-
sumption that such a nexus exists, as applied in a two-party constella-
tion, seems hardly appropriate. Rather, it is necessary to require some
material factual element establishing the link.
6. Conclusion
The GATT security exception is not a totally open-ended provi-
sion permitting Contracting Parties to evade the legal bonds imposed
by the General Agreement. Rather, it strikes a balance between grant-
ing States broad discretion to act when they feel their security is at
stake and objective prerequisites which have to be met to trigger that
159. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS Supp. No. 29, at 23 (1983) (Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement).
160. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS Supp. No. 29, at 9 (1983) (Ministerial Declaration).
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extra-ordinary competence. These objective prerequisites are subject
to ordinary methods of treaty interpretation. An application of ordi-
nary methods of treaty interpretation demonstrates that the phrase
"essential security interests" is to be read as excluding the Contracting
Parties' interest in protecting what they perceive to be "vital indus-
tries." For these situations GATT offers several other possibilities, in-
cluding waivers granted under article XXV. Apart from this
limitation, the acting State is not limited by article XXI(b)(iii) in its
discretionary choice to determine whether a measure, prima facie ille-
gal under GATT, is required by its essential security interests. How-
ever, this discretionary power only comes to bear if the objective
prerequisites listed under article XXI(b)(i)-(iii) are met. In particular,
"other emergency in international relations" describes situations
which are grave enough to allow States under general international
law to resort to the use of economic reprisals. Thus, a State may only
act under the umbrella of the security exception when the State
against which it is acting is either at war or has taken such action as to
warrant the use of economic reprisals under general public interna-
tional law.
VII. ARTICLE XXI AND GENERAL PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Having discussed the substantive law of article XXI(b)(iii), the
question arises as to what extent general public international law ap-
plies in situations in which a Contracting Party to the General Agree-
ment intends to use economic measures for political purposes. The
issue remains of eminent practical importance. As will be recalled,
several Contracting Parties used general public international law to
justify their use of economic measures for political purposes 161 and
stated that article XXI(b)(iii) was merely a declaratory provision, "re-
flecting" the pertinent rules of general public international law.1 62
From a different perspective, the States against which such measures
have been taken have frequently claimed that the acting States had not
only violated GATT but general international law as well.163
161. E.g., the EEC, Canada and Australia (acting against Argentina), the Federal Republic
of Germany when acting against Iceland, the United States when justifying its action against
Nicaragua.
162. Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-Economic Reasons, GATT Doc.
L/5319/Rev.1 (May 5, 1982).
163. GATT Council, supra note 67, at 15.
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A. GATT as a Self-Contained Regime?
General public international law can only influence the analysis if
it is applicable in the first place. It is not applicable if GATT consti-
tutes a "self-contained regime." This concept, introduced by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in the Teheran-Hostage-Case, t 64 describes
a sub-system of international law embracing a complete and exhaus-
tive set of "primary and secondary rules."' 165 Thus, in principle it en-
tirely excludes the application of general legal rules and principles,
particularly the application of counter-measures normally at the dis-
posal of an injured party.1 66 Most treaty systems, including those with
an institutionalized dispute-settlement procedure of their own, 167 do
not meet those requirements. At some point (especially the unsuccess-
ful exhaustion of a specialized dispute-settlement procedure) the party
to a treaty-based sub-system can usually fall back on counter-measures
available under general international law. The influence of general in-
ternational law on "primary" rules is, generally speaking, even more
obvious.168 However, the ICJ169 and some scholars see exceptions to
the general rule - as did the Icelandic delegate with regard to GATT
when he rejected Germany's claim that its partial ban on Icelandic fish
was a justified counter-measure under international law. Iceland
thought this question to be irrelevant, as "GATT could only be con-
cerned with the application or functioning of the General Agreement
and not with any other international principles." '1 70
Some aspects of GATT practice seem to sustain Iceland's position.
To some extent, organs of GATT take their distance from general in-
ternational law. No Panel report has so far referred to a decision of an
international arbitral award or to decisions of the PCIJ or the ICJ.
General principles of international law, including procedural law, are
only mentioned to the extent they have been applied by previous
panels or practice of the Contracting Parties or as being required by
logic and necessity. They have not been introduced as universally rec-
164. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 41
(Decision of May 24).
165. See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, at 30-63.
166. Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 115 (1985).
167. See generally K. OELLERS-FRAHM & N. WOHLER, DISPUTE SETFLEMENT IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1984).
168. See VCLT, supra note 27, at art. 31(3)(c).
169. According to the ICJ, "[t]he rules of diplomatic law constitute a self-contained regime."
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 40 (Deci-
sion of May 24).
170. GAIT Council, supra note 67, at 15.
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ognized international legal principles, able, at least, to buttress a legal
claim within the GATT system.
These elements, however, do not suffice to overcome the presump-
tion against a closed system.17 1 GATT, obviously, does not contain an
explicit exclusion of "secondary" rules derived from general interna-
tional law; nor can the position that the rules contained in the General
Agreement are exhaustive by implication be established by a pro-
nounced esprit de corps. These are mere indications that GATT is a
specialized sub-system of international law, whose more specific rules
will often prevail over general rules and principles.
Although the GATT is not a self-contained regime, the application
of general international law rules and principles could be excluded
specifically by article XXI(b)('ii). This would imply an understanding
of the security exception as not only being an escape clause, but as
being the "final word" on economic measures for political purposes
between Contracting Parties to the General Agreement. However,
such a reading would not reflect the will of the parties as expressed in
the text of article XXI(b)(iii). Analysis has revealed that the security
exception was not supposed to "govern" the use of economic measures
for political ends; rather, its function is to limit the jurisdiction of the
General Agreement in extraordinary times. This systemic self-re-
straint excludes an understanding of article XXI(b)(iii) as an exhaus-
tive provision which would have left no room for the application of
general international law.
B. Possible Limitations for the Application
of Article XXI(b)(iii)
1. The Principle of Good Faith
The principle of good faith has its primary field of application in
contract and treaty relations.1 72 It requires parties who are in a spe-
cial legal relationship to refrain from dishonesty, unfairness and con-
duct that takes undue advantage of one another. It also underlies the
most fundamental treaty law norm, namely the principle of pacta sunt
servanda.173 The principle of "good faith" is closely related to the civil
171. Simma, supra note 166, at 115. A self-contained regime, being the exception from the
general rule, can only be assumed once it is established that general international law does not
influence the secondary rules of the sub-system. Thus, the party claiming the existence of a self-
contained regime has to overcome an assumption to the contrary.
172. But see Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 473 (Judgment of Dec. 20) ("One
of the basic principles governing the... performance of legal obligations, whatever their source,
is the principle of good faith.")
173. I. SINCLAIR, supra note 29, at 83; see 2 Y.B. ITrr'L L. COMM'N 211 (1966) for further
references.
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law concept of abus de droit, which stands for the equally well estab-
lished principle of customary international law that the exercise of a
right for the sole purpose of evading an obligation or of causing injury
is unlawful.' 74 Thus, the interpretation of treaties has to be performed
in good faith, taking into account the context, the object, the purpose
and the different interests and backgrounds of the various parties in-
volved. Article 18 of the VCLT offers another example of the princi-
ple as it requires signatory States to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty before ratification. Even
apart from treaties, though, it is well-established law 175 that States
have to fulfill in good faith their obligations "under the generally rec-
ognized principles and rules of international law."' 176 Yet, it is clear
that the "standard of care" a State has to meet in its relations with
another State depends largely on the "closeness" of the mutual rela-
tionship: prototypical examples of circumstances giving rise to such
closeness are geographical or topical proximity (common border),
77
previous behavior 178 or inter-governmental arrangements.
Article XXI(b)(iii) waives to a large degree the benefit of this
GATT-specific "rule-of-reason" limitation. Where economic counter-
measures are used for non-economic purposes, the appropriateness of
an action is determined by the pertinent State's self-judgment of neces-
sity for the protection of its essential security interests and not by an
objective evaluation of the various treaty obligations under GATT.
174. See Kiss, Abuse of Rights, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4
(1984) for examples of state practice; See also Zoller, La Bonne Foi en Droit International Public
in 28 PUBLICATIONS DE LA REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1977);
Iluyomade, The Scope and Content of a Complaint of Abuse of Right in International Law, 16
HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1975); Paul, The Abuse of Rights and Bona Fides in International Law, 28
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 107 (1977);
Politis, Le Problime des Limitations de la Souverainetd et la Theorie de rAbus des Droits dans les
Rapports Internationaux, 6 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1925). See Franck, At Arm's Length: The
Coming Law of Collective Bargaining in International Relations, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 579 (1975)
for the application of the principle of good faith in international economic law.
175. See Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2624,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
176. Id.
177. Randelzhofer & Simma, Das Kernkraftwerk an der Grenze, Eine "Ultra-Hazardous Ac-
tivity" im Schnittpunkt von internationalem Nachbarrecht und Umweltschutz, in FESTSCHRIFr
FOR FRIEDRICH BERBER 389 (1973); Dupuy, La Responsabilitd Internationale des Etats pour les
Dommages d'Origine Technologique et Industrielle, in PUBLICATIONS DE LA REVUE GtNtRAL
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC No. 27 33-34, 158-169 (1976).
178. For examples of liability for ultra-hazardous previous activities see the several pertinent
ILC Reports by R. Ago. U.N. Docs. A/CN.4/217, A/CN.4/233, A/CN.4/246/Add. 1-3, A/




Thus, the treaty-based notion of reasonableness does not apply to ac-
tions under article XXI(b)(iii).
This renunciation, however, does not apply to general interna-
tional law in which the principle of bona fide is enshrined. Hence, the
notion of good faith in its more general meaning still comes into play;
only the specific protection which normally is the hallmark of a treaty
relationship has been derogated by article XXI(b)(iii). The exclusion
of considering specific rights and duties under GATT in evaluating the
"standard of care" does not mean that the existence of a treaty rela-
tionship between the Contracting Parties concerned is completely ir-
relevant. The standard of good faith set forth above is loose, not easy
to apply or administer. However, the principle of bona fide is never
defined by clear-cut lines, and yet it is routinely applied by courts and
honored by the subjects of law.
2. Proportionality
That a legally relevant reaction has to show due relation to the
conduct provoking it, amounts, in a nutshell, to the content of the
principle of proportionality. 179 In the domestic sphere, particularly in
constitutional law, this principle has become a sophisticated tool for
balancing conflicting positions. It is part of the international law of
self-defense and reprisal, at the latest since the Caroline Case.' 80
There has been (and still is) some dispute concerning the proper crite-
ria for measuring the scope of the allowed harm. Some believe that
the harm done by a retaliation should never be greater than the origi-
nal wrong. Others reject the idea of an absolute determinant link be-
tween these two positions. State practice leaves rather little doubt that
the latter position is the correct - if not necessarily the desirable -
description of international law. As a matter of practical concern it
seems unreasonable to ask the victim to invest too much effort in keep-
ing the exact balance between wrong received and wrong done. How-
ever, even in time of quick decisions, it is possible and required by law
to keep the reaction to a wrong somewhat proportionate. Thus, the
requirement of proportionality in article XXI(b)(iii) may place some
179. G. BRAIBANT, LE PRINCIPE DE LA PROPORTIONALITt 297 (1974).
180. While accepting the concept of self-defense as justification for the violation of interna-
tional obligations, the United States claimed that such actions could only escape the odium of
illegality if the dangers against which they had been directed were "instant, overwhelming, leav-
ing no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation;" any prima facie illegal act, justified by
the necessity of self-defense, had to be "limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it."
Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938); 26 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1372 (1837-38); 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1126 (1840-
41); 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193 (1841-42).
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limit on the amount of derogation a Contracting Party may take from
GATT.
3. Prohibition of Intervention in Internal Affairs
As has been stated at the outset, one of the fundamenatal tenets of
international law is the notion of sovereignty of States. As a corollary,
the prohibition of intervention serves to protect this status of the sub-
jects of international law.1"" This principle seems, however, to be of
diminished practical relevance for a scenario in which article
XXI(b)(iii) plays a role. Under the interpretation developed here, the
security exception covers only cases in which the object of economic
coercion has committed an international wrongful act. In this circum-
stance, the other State is legally entitled to enforce its rights under
international law, provided the counter-measure meets the other stan-
dards of legality, e.g., proportionality.
18 2
C. Possible Escapes from GA TTfor Political Purposes under
General International Law
1. Fundamental Change of Circumstances
As already mentioned above, general public international law rec-
ognizes that a party may be exempt from certain treaty obligations
upon a fundamental change of circumstances. The room left for a gen-
eral exemption from any GATT obligation for political purposes via
the clausula seems small indeed. Not only is article XXI(b)(iii) an
extremely broad, and more specific, escape clause, but even complete
withdrawal from GATT is possible with 6 months notice.'8 3 There-
fore, it can be assumed that the more specific provisions of articles
XXI(b)(iii) and XXXI have hardly left room for the application of the
more general notion of fundamental change in circumstances.
2. General Law of Reprisal and Self-Defense
Before further examining to what extent States may have recourse
181. See 22 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFr FOR VbLKERRECHT (Economic
Coercion in Public and Private International Law); K. BOCKSLAFF, DAS VOLKERRECHTLICHE
INTERVENTIONSVERBOT ALS SCHRANKE AUSSENPOLITISCH MOTIVIERTER HANDEL-
SBESCHRANKUNGEN (1987).
182. This list of possible limits to state action under article XXI(b)(iii) is by no means in-
tended to be complete; rather, the notions mentioned here would deserve attention in almost
every pertinent case. Thus, every case requires an analysis to what extent the law of GATT is
addressing the issue and to what extent it prevails as lex specialis. Where those concepts pay
tribute to contractual relations, however, article XXI denies the use of the specific GAT con-
tractual link for determining the legality of pertinent actions.
183. GATT, art. XXXI.
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to general rules of international law, it seems appropriate to consider
in what situations article XXI(b)(iii) and general international law
may give conflicting answers. In the situation of war and of any
armed attack which allows the lawful use of force, it is clear from the
above that whenever "war" or the (even potential) use of force are
involved, article XXI(b)(iii) poses no barriers whatsoever. There is
thus no collision with general international law. In situations in which
other matters affect State "essential security interests," article
XXI(b)(iii) supersedes (and partly incorporates) the general law of
economic coercion for political purposes.
Where security interests are not involved, however, GATT does
not supply a clear answer. Thus, the question arises whether GATT
limits prima facie violations of its rules only to the extent set forth in
the General Agreement itself (e.g., article XXI(b)(iii)) or whether the
law of reprisal allows a Contracting Party to use economic measures
(prima facie violating GATT) to enforce other treaty or customary
law obligations. 1 4 An elaborate discussion of this question would
leave the scope of this study. Because of the potential practical rele-
vance, however, an attempt will be made to offer the sketchy outline of
an answer. It is well-established, for instance, that the violation of a
treaty obligation represents one of the prototypes of an internationally
wrongful act.185 Under general principles of international law,' 8 6 a
State can counteract with a per se illegal act to enforce its right to
compliance with treaty obligations. Thus, it can be assumed that it is
legal to violate obligations arising out of a treaty after the breach of an
obligation rooted in another treaty relationship between the same
partners. 187
The question remains whether this general rule is applicable to
GATT. Put differently, does article XXI(b)(iii), read in' context with
the other escape clauses of the General Agreement impliedly exclude
the unilateral use of economic measures for the self-enforcement of
184. The following case might serve as example. Country A (a developed country) and coun-
try B (a less developed country) have concluded a loan agreement to which public international
law applies. B has received the money. B now thinks that the repayment constitutes an "unjust
enrichment of the haves to the detriment of the have-nots." It stops payment, although pay-
ments would be required according to all relevant standards. Can A suspend Article I and II of
GATT?
185. I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 59 (1983); I.
VON MONCH, DAS V6LKERRECHTLICHE DELIKT 134 (1963).
186. These principles are not derogated by the principle enshrined in article 60 of the VCLT,
supra note 27; see generally A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, supra note 29, at 512.
187. White, Legal Consequences of Wrongful Acts in International Economic Law, 16 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 137 (1985) does not mention that possibility; see also B. SINHA; UNILATERAL
DENUNCIATIONS OF TREATIES BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS BY OTHER PARTIES (1966).
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international law?"' A good case can be made that the answer has to
be affirmative. The wealth of exceptions in GATT, the various pos-
sibilities of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to suspend the applica-
tion of certain provisions and the short notice necessary before
complete withdrawal suggest that there is no other possibility to evade
the obligations incurred as a reaction to a preceding violation of inter-
national law. Deciding otherwise implies great potential for instability
of the multilateral trading system and thus endangers the General
Agreement's purpose of ensuring stability in international economic
relations. It must be left open for further discussion, however, if over-
riding interests and principles might require that that price be paid in
certain instances.
VIII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE XXI
Absent a central authority, international law has to be self-en-
forced by the parties concerned. In contrast, more sophisticated legal
sub-systems like GATT tend to have some sort of institutionalized dis-
pute settlement procedure. 89 The following section of the article will
examine the relationship between the GATT dispute settlement proce-
dure and the security exception.
A. Duty to Inform
The 1982 Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES concern-
ing article XXI spells out the duty of Contracting Parties acting under
the security exception to inform the other Contracting Parties of the
measures taken; this duty is, of course, subject to the provision of arti-
cle XXI(a). Given that the targeted Contracting Party will be the first
to notice the actions taken under article XXI(b), the real issue is
whether the State acting under article XXI must notify the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. Although it was not expressly stated in the
Decision, it appears that this had been the intent of its drafters. 190
188. See Gornig, Die Vdlkerrechtliche Zulassigkeit eines Handelsembargos, 45 JURISTEN
ZEITUNG 113, 122 (1990) for current examples of such treaty-based exclusions.
189. See generally D. CARREAU, P. JUILLARD & T. FLORY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
fCONOMIQUE (1980); SocitTf FRAN§AISE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, COLLOQUE
D'ORLEANS 1972, ASPECTS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIQUE (1972); Beirlaen, La Dis-
tinction entre les Diffirends Juridiques et les Differends Politiques dans la Pratique des Organisa-
tions Internationales, 11 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 405 (1975); G.
MALINVERNI, LE REGLEMENT DES DIFFtRENDS DANS LES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATION-
ALES ECONOMIQUES (1974); Jackson, Dispute Settlement Techniques between Nations Concerning
Economic Relations-with Special Emphasis on GA7, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DIs-
PUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 39 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984).
190. The question concerning whether notification was necessary had been discussed in the
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Moreover, this outcome is also required by the acting State's duty to
act in good faith within its multilateral treaty relationship. The possi-
bility of exercising unilateral suspension of a multilateral agreement
with now more than 100 Contracting Parties without providing some
sort of notice to the group as a whole would bring so much instability
to the treaty framework as to compel notification to the decision-mak-
ing bodies of the GATT. 191
B. Duty to Justify
Is it enough merely to inform the CONTRACTING PARTIES
and the target of the measures in question or is the acting State re-
quired to articulate and demonstrate the basis for its claim that the
security exception is applicable? GATT allows an early involvement
of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in efforts to find solutions for
contentious matters under article XXII(2). This conciliation and me-
diation effort would be turned into a farce if the CONTRACTING
PARTIES were required to undertake their efforts without knowing
the relevant facts and legal arguments. It therefore seems indispensa-
ble that the acting State supply sufficient facts to exclude improper
motivation (i.e., economic reasons) and to show that the objective
standards under (i)-(iii) are met. The principle of good faith equally
requires the pertinent Contracting Party to make available the mate-
rial permitting the assessment of the matter by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.
C. Application of the GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedure to
Actions under Article XXI
The procedure embodied in article XXIII of GATT is the core of
the rather unique way in which the General Agreement has provided
for the settlement of disputes between Contracting Parties. More than
this text alone though, the practice of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES and of the Council has fashioned the dispute settlement proce-
dure we know today and which is likely to play an even more
Council. In particular, the EEC delegate had initially rather strongly rejected such a duty.
GATIT Council, Minutes of Meeting held May 7, 1982, GATT Doc. C/M/157 (June 22, 1982) at
10. The Decision, although being obviously a compromise, does not follow this initial position
when stating that the "contracting parties should be informed to the fullest extent possible of
trade measures taken under Article XXI." 1982 Decision, supra note 83, at 23.
191. "[I]t is clear that the effective supervision of the operation of a multilateral trade treaty
like the GAIT requires transparency in ... measures adopted by member countries. For there
to be this transparency, they have to be notified by governments." 0. LONG, LAW AND IrS
LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 74 (1985).
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important role after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 192 The
dispute settlement procedure, having gained a great deal of attention
in the scholarly literature, needs no particular introduction. 93 For
present purposes it suffices to remind the reader that GATT is not
equipped with an institutionalized judicial organ; rather the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, i.e., the "Member States" of GATT acting
jointly (article XXV(1)), are supposed to "make appropriate recom-
mendations" to the Contracting Parties concerned or "give a ruling"
(article XXIII). During the 40 years of GATT, a highly successful
adjudicative system has emerged which does not resemble the rather
scarce relevant passages of the GATT in every detail. As a matter of
fact 194 - and now as a matter of law' 9 - the CONTRACTING
PARTIES will establish a panel for legal analysis of the dispute on the
request of any involved Contracting Party after certain prerequisites
are met. This will be on the basis of so-called Terms of Reference
which until 1989 had not been standardized but were subject to some-
times extensive negotiations. 196 In the words of the new standardized
Terms, the panels' task is "to examine, in the light of the relevant
GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES by [the complaining Contracting Party] . . . and to make such
findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in article XX-
111:2." 197 Panels apply the relevant provisions of GATT to the facts of
the case in a quasi-judicial fashion. However, in order to become a
192. See Petersmann, Mid-Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round and the 1989
Improvements to the GA TT Dispute Settlements Procedures, 32 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 280 (1989).
193. See generally J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 83; Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA TT, 11
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 57 (1987); Hudec, Reforming the GATT Adjudication Procedures. The
Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988); Hudec, GA TT Dispute Settlement
after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
194. Since 1948, GATT Panels have decided more than 138 cases. GATT, Analytical Index,
art. XXIII-89, GATT Doc. Leg/2. For the various "blessings of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES" in the past, see, e.g., 1979 Understanding, supra note 122. See also CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 36, at 61 (1988-89)
(Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures-Decision of April 12,
1989) [hereinafter 1989 Decision].
195. A right to a Panel is recognized in several of the 1979 codes. Nothing in the GATT
requires the Contracting Parties to establish a GATT Panel. Because of the de facto consensus
voting rule, any party to a dispute can effectively block a Panel. That this is done so rarely might
indicate that a new internal GATT rule has been formed through the practice of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES, a question too far-reaching to be examined further here. Moreover, the
1989 Decision, supra note 194, seems to grant a pertinent right to a Panel.
196. The 1979 Understanding, supra note 122, mentions the practice of furnishing terms of
reference. The 1989 Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, supra note 194, establishes
standard terms which apply unless the parties to a dispute agree otherwise within 20 days of
establishment of the panel; see id. at 63-4.
197. Id.
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legally binding ruling, GATT practice requires that a panel report
must be accepted without objection by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. 19
8
Although the outlined procedure is not specified in detail in the
General Agreement itself, it is solidly founded upon article XXIII,
which clearly supports the development of the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedure into an institutionalized quasi-judicial system. Para-
graph 1 of article XXIII places the "failure . . . to carry out ...
obligations under this Agreement" prominently in the first rank of rea-
sons for which a Contracting Party may initiate the consultation and
dispute settlement procedure of GATT. Also, article XXIII(2), by
giving the CONTRACTING PARTIES the competence to give "rul-
ings," envisages as one option for a possible response to the complaint
under article XXIII a decision based on the rule of law. As an alterna-
tive, article XXIII provides the possibility of handing down "recom-
mendations," which clearly implies a more political kind of decision-
making. Thus, without unduly disregarding the considerable and gen-
uine evolution of the GATT dispute settlement into an institution even
more pronouncedly dedicated to the rule of law, it is fair to state that
article XXIII already contains the notion of review of actions of Con-
tracting Parties and determines as one possible standard of review the
compatibility with the law of GATT.
D. Panel Reports Dealing with the Security Exception
The only two Panel Reports dealing with article XXI concerned
actions by the United States against Nicaragua in the midst of the last
decade.
1. United States - Import of Sugar from Nicaragua' 99
Between 1982 and 1983, the United States considerably reduced
the quota for sugar imports coming from Nicaragua. President Rea-
gan stated that by denying Nicaragua that benefit, he hoped to dimin-
ish the resources available to that country for financing its military
build-up and its support for subversion and extremist violence in the
region. Nicaragua claimed that the U.S. action violated the ministe-
rial Declaration of November 1982,200 particularly several core provi-
198. This gives the parties involved a de facto veto, contrary to GATT article XXV(4). See
J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 94.
199. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GAT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 31, at 67 (1983-84) (Report of the Panel adopted on March 13, 1984)
[hereinafter Nicaraguan Sugar].
200. 1982 Decision, supra note 83, at 23.
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sions of the GATT (articles II, XI, XIII). In the course of the
procedure, the United States gave notice to the Panel that:
[I]t was neither invoking any exception under the provisions of the Gen-
eral Agreement nor intended to defend its actions in GATT terms....
The action of the United States did of course affect trade but was not
taken for trade policy reasons....
[Ilts action . . . was fully justified in the context in which it was
taken.... [The United States] did not believe that the review and resolu-
tion of that broader dispute was within the ambit of the GATT.20
The Panel took this as an occasion to avoid addressing the issue
whether the U.S. action was covered by Article XXI.
The panel noted that the United States had not invoked any of the excep-
tions provided for in the General Agreement permitting discriminatory
quantitative restrictions contrary to Article XIII. The Panel therefore
did not examine whether the reduction in Nicaragua's quota could be
justified under any such provision.
Thus, article XXI was treated as a defense of the Contracting Party
acting prima facie illegally, which would come into play only when
specifically invoked by the acting State. This understanding of the
Panel's reasoning is unavoidable because the United States had made
it very clear that it had taken this measure for political-military rea-
sons. There were enough facts known to the Panel that would have
allowed it to start an inquiry into the U.S. measures' coverage by arti-
cle XXI. Despite this, the Panel did not explain how this method was
to be reconciled with the text of the security exception, that "nothing
in this Agreement" - thus presumably also article XIII (which in the
Panel's opinion the United States had violated) - "shall be construed
to prevent any Contracting Party to take the action it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests in time of
emergency in international relations."
2. United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua 20 2
Like the first report, the second report dealing with the security
exception neither states prerequisites nor consequences of its findings.
201. See Nicaraguan Sugar, supra note 199, at 72.
202. United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua - Report by the Panel, GATT
Doc. L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986) (Restricted) [hereinafter Nicaraguan Trade Measures]. The report
has so far not been accepted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES due to the refusal of the United
States to proceed. See GATI Council, Minutes of Meeting held November 5-6, 1986, GATT
Doc. C/M/204 (Nov. 19, 1986) at 6-18 (Restricted); Minutes of Meeting held April 15, 1987,
GATT Doc. C/M/208 (May 11, 1987) at 17-18; Minutes of Meeting held July 15, 1987, GATT
Doc. C/M/212 (Aug. 6, 1987) at 24-29; Minutes of Meeting held June 21-22, 1989, GATT Doe.
C/M/234 (July 31, 1989) at 37-42; Minutes of Meeting held April 13, 1990, GATT Doe. C/M/
240 (May 4, 1990). See also United States- Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, GATT Doe. L/
6661 (Mar. 23, 1990) (communications from Nicaragua), by which Nicaragua informed the
CONTRACTING PARTIES of the lifting of all U.S. measures.
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This time though, the deficit was not a self-inflicted constraint, but
was instead forced upon it by the terms of reference20 3 which stated in
their pertinent parts that "the Panel cannot examine or judge the va-
lidity or motivation for the invocation of article XXI(b)(iii) by the
United States." Appropriately, therefore, the Panel stressed that it
considered itself not limited by the text of article XXI itself but by the
terms of reference which would not allow an examination of the role
of article XXI in the matter. Therefore, the report concluded that "it
could find the United States neither to be complying with its obliga-
tions under the Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its obligations
under that Agreement. '
'204
This being the case, the Panel noted that the CONTRACTING
PARTIES had, generally speaking, two options if the Panel were to
find that the measures of the United States had nullified or impaired
benefits to Nicaragua under GATT. It could recommend that the
United States withdraw the measures taken or authorize Nicaragua to
suspend the application of obligations under GATT toward the United
States. In the opinion of the panelists, none of these possible alterna-
tives would be effective. According to the drafting history and Panel
caselaw, the United States would not be obliged to follow any recom-
mendation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES as long as its action
was not found to be illegal. As to the second alternative, the panel
recalled that the United States had enacted a two-way embargo. Thus
there was no realistic possibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES
taking a decision that would reestablish the balance of advantages
which had accrued to Nicaragua under GATT within the framework
of article XXIII.
Two further issues taken up by the report deserve to be mentioned
for the purposes of this article. The first is of general interest for any
GATT dispute in which a Panel is involved. Was it possible for the
Panel to decide to grant a general waiver to third parties, not actually
involved in the matter, to permit Contracting Parties which so desire
to compensate for the effects of the embargo by giving, notwithstand-
ing the general MFN treatment, differential and more favorable treat-
ment to goods from Nicaragua?20 5 Referring to GATT practice, 2° 6 in
particular the 1979 Understanding on dispute settlement, which states
203. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, March 12, 1986, GATT Doc. C/M/196 (Apr. 2,
1986) at 7 (Restricted); for the preceding history see supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
204. Nicaraguan Trade Measures, supra note 202, at 14.
205. Id. at 17.
206. See CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS Supp. No. 18, at 3, 183-188 (1973-74) (Report of the Panel Adopted Feb. 2, 1974)
(the only panel report recommending a waiver).
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in its pertinent part that "[t]he function of panels is to assist the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES in discharging their responsibilities under ar-
ticle XXIII:2, ' '20 7 the Panel answered the question in the negative.
The second point deals with the relationship between general inter-
national law and GATT. Nicaragua had argued that the Panel had to
take into account the principles of international law when interpreting
GATT. To this, the Panel replied that it could not take up this ques-
tion as its task was limited to examining the matter "in the light of the
relevant GATT provisions." Without explaining this quite remarka-
ble opinion, the Panel implied that the law of GATT and general pub-
lic international law were separate bodies of law, rather than the
GATT being a specialized sub-system which generally, but not neces-
sarily, prevails over the general rules of international law.
20 8
E. Review of Legality under Article XXIII
A Contracting Party who feels that any benefit accruing to it di-
rectly or indirectly under GATT is being nullified and impaired be-
cause of the failure of another Contracting Party to carry out its
GATT obligations is encouraged to "make written representations or
proposals to the other Contracting Party or parties it considers to be
concerned" 2°9 in order to "adjust the matter" and eventually gain ac-
cess to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under article XXIII. How-
ever, illegality of the pertinent action leading to nullification and
207. 1979 Understanding, supra note 122, at 23.
208. At the end of its report in Nicaraguan Trade Measures, the Panel asked the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES to consider the following questions:
If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the
contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that this
general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked excessively
or for purposes other than those set out in this provision?
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES give a panel the task of examining a case involving
an Article XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine the justification of that invoca-
tion, do they limit the adversely affected contracting party's right to have its complaint
investigated in accordance with Article XXIII:2? Are the powers of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES under Article XXIII:2 sufficient to provide redress to contracting parties sub-
jected to a two-way embargo?
Nicaraguan Trade Measures, supra note 202, at 18-19.
The first question raised has already been dealt with: it is not reconcilable with the law of
article XXI(b)(iii) to grant to the party invoking the exception sole authority to determine its
interpretation and scope. The third question is an interesting issue de legeferenda, but is beyond
the scope of this analysis of the security exception de lege lata. The reports themselves raise
further questions. The first report did not explain how it could assume a violation of GATT by
the United States without having recourse to article XXI in the interpreting of the articles the
United States allegedly had violated. The second Panel did not explain how it could interpret the
security exception without acknowledging the well established principle that an international
treaty provision has to be read with due regard to pertinent rules of international law, an issue
already dealt with above.
209. GATT, art. XXIII.
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impairment is not a necessary prerequisite for the specific redress
granted by article XXIII. Under GATT caselaw, a complaint will
eventually be successful if the "damaged" party could reasonably ex-
pect the other Contracting Party not to take the damaging measure.
210
Article XXIII does not contain a presumption or command of
non-application to "political" disputes. To the contrary, the ex-
tremely broad conceptual framework drawn by it (inter alia, "any
other situation" may give rise to a successful article XXIII complaint)
entails a strong presumption for applying the GATT dispute settle-
ment procedure to any dispute in which the obedience to GATT rules
and principles is at issue. During the preparatory deliberations of the
GATT and the ITO Charter, the application of the Dispute Settlement
procedure to the security exception was never put into question. It
seems to have been clear to all participants that article XXI would not
be exempted from review by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
21'
Several statements made apparent that this was seen as the only possi-
ble way to avoid abuse of such a vast exception, 212 other than the
"spirit" in which that provision would be applied. 213 Moreover, arti-
cle XXI itself does not exclude article XXIII(2) procedures; as set
forth above, it is not within the exclusive competence of the State act-
ing for political purposes to define the security exception.
However, the formula that "nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to prevent" a State from action protecting its security inter-
ests under the conditions set forth in (i)-(iii) could be understood as
not only excluding "prevention" in a strict sense, but also ex posterior
review of actions under the standard of legality. There is no merit to
this position. The reason for such a rule foreclosing review of the "va-
lidity or ... the motivation for the invocation of article XXI(b)(3)" 21
4
to be examined or judged is founded upon the desire to preserve a high
level of flexibility for the Contracting Party acting under Article XXI.
As valid as this motivation might be, it cannot sustain the exclusion of
article XXI from investigation under article XXIII(2). However, be-
cause article XXI grants the State broad discretion to act whenever it
feels that its essential security interests are at stake, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES (and for that purpose a panel) can only ex-
210. See CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GATT, Fourth Session, GATT/CP.4/39 (Mar.
31, 1950) (Report of Working Party on the Austrialian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate).
211. U.N. Doc E/PC/T/A/SR.33, at 4-5 (1947).
212. Id.
213. See id. at 3.
214. This was expressed by the terms of reference for the Nicaraguan Trade Measures Panel
Report. Nicaraguan Trade Measures, supra note 202, at 2.
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amine (a) whether the objective prerequisites under article XXI(b)(iii)
have been met, (b) whether no other violation of applicable principles
had taken place and (c) whether the State acted for what it was enti-
tled to understand as its essential security interests. The latter point is
probably the most prone to examine the "general appropriateness" of
an action under article XXI. This clearly would not be within the
province of the CONTRACTING PARTIES and procedural devices
have to take care of this point.
F. The Political Nature of Actions under Article XXI as Reason to
Exclude a Review of Legality by a Panel?
Another basis that several States have suggested as precluding re-
view of actions under article XXI is that their political nature makes
them unsuitable for review by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
in particular for a Panel procedure. Under this view, questions touch-
ing the very core of a State's political interest are at most suited for
discussions in an international political forum like the UN Security
Council or the General Assembly; a quasi-judicial review of such State
action by an arbiter not self-selected by the State concerned is, accord-
ing to that opinion, not reconcilable with the notion of sovereignty.
Already in 1951 Czechoslovakia had advanced a similar argument
and had made an effort to base it on article 86(3) of the ITO Charter
which provided with regard to "essentially political matters" that
[I]n order to avoid conflict of responsibility between the United Nations
and the [International Trade] Organization with respect to such matters,
any measure taken by a member directly in connection with a political
matter brought before the United Nations in accordance with the provi-
sions of Chapter IV or VI of the United Nations Charter shall be deemed
to fall within the scope of the United Nations, and shall not be subject to
the provisions of this Charter. 21
5
The argument against a review of legality under article XXIII de-
rived from the specific relationship between GATT and ITO Charter
is hardly sustainable. Article 86(3) of the ITO Charter is not applica-
ble to GATT. As is well known, the former never became binding
treaty-law. Furthermore, even if one were to overcome that obstacle,
it remains undeniable that GATT expressly did not refer to Chapter
VII of the ITO Charter and hence to Article 86(3). This follows from
the express reference to other chapters of the Charter; e contrario,
other parts of the Charter were not supposed to have immediate legal
relevance. 21
6
215. ITO Charter, supra note 8, at 48.
216. Article 86 is part of chapter VII of the ITO Charter, to which the text of GATT ex-
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These technical arguments serve as camouflage for the real issue at
stake. The reluctance of States to submit the use of economic meas-
ures for security purposes to examination under the regular dispute
settlement procedure reflects a general attitude of States toward arbi-
tration in politically sensitive matters. Several concepts, developed
both by international arbitral awards and by scholarly writers, have
tried to reconcile the notion of compulsory adjudication with the inter-
est of States to maintain a reserved domain of action free from inter-
ference by third-party arbiters. The "political question doctrine,"
"justiciability of a dispute, .... legal vs. political dispute" and our ear-
lier example of the "vital interests clause" have all been used in this
sense.
These doctrines recognize that some disputes, although possibly
justiciable as such, cannot be settled by judicial decision. 21 7 Without
taking a position as to the theoretical merits of these doctrines, one has
to acknowledge that they have the advantage of some empirical con-
clusiveness. States do walk away from international judicial proceed-
ings when they perceive that their vital interests are not sufficiently
appreciated. Moreover, while the ICJ has - some think in a rather
cavalier fashion - never accepted those concepts in its case law, it
has, perhaps not coincidentally, lost much of its importance as a
"World Court." Be that as it may, obviously, serious people have seri-
ous differences as to the role of adjudication in politically charged dis-
putes, and few of the arguments advanced by either side can be
rejected out of hand. As stimulating as some might perceive this de-
bate to be, it is of little importance for present purposes. What has
been called in previous sections of this article a "review" of actions
under article XXI is not at all claimed to be a tool for the solution or
settlement of politically charged disputes. The only and quite limited
purpose of a "review" of economic measures for political ends under
the GATT dispute settlement procedure is (a) whether the dispute is
of a "political" character (which would in ICJ procedures, for exam-
ple, give occasion to discuss questions of "justicability") and (b)
whether the dispute has reached a certain magnitude or, more specifi-
cally, whether a breach of law was involved. When, and only when,
pressly does not refer, while chapters I to VI and IX of the ITO Charter are referred to by article
XXIX of GATT. Even if one were to apply article 86(3), one would have to take into considera-
tion that it was presupposing a UN Dispute Settlement Practice quite different from the actual
one; the very purposes of the provision, to facilitate effective solutions based on the rule of law,
would probably force a reading not excluding disputes from the only review of legality available
in practical terms.
217. See Steinberger, The International Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF Dis-
PUTES 202 (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds. 1974).
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those preconditions are met, GATT's "jurisdiction to prescribe" ends.
Thus, an analysis under article XXIII has to solve the question of
whether there is a "political dispute" and not how to solve it. The
concepts aiming at limiting the role of international arbitration do not
oppose this type of an analysis of a dispute; to the contrary, they imply
that international adjudicatory bodies called upon to decide an inter-
national dispute undertake this very exercise in order to abstain from
further action if a dispute turns out to be of political character. Thus,
there is no ground for claiming that article XXI could not be subject
to the regular dispute settlement procedure of GATT: a Panel report
would simply determine whether a situation was of such importance
for GATT to self-restrain its applicability. Even such a determination
might be not free from political overtones. This, however, is not
enough to make its procedure "political" and thus not within the
reach of GATT's dispute settlement.
21 8
G. The "'Right to a Panel" and the Review of Article XXI Cases
At the time the second Nicaragua report was drafted, it was ques-
tionable whether a Contracting Party to GATT had a "right to a
Panel" under articles XXII and XXIII. The doctrine tended to an-
swer the question in the negative, despite the recognition of a "stand-
ing practice" by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 1979 and the
possible implications of this acknowledgment under the well-estab-
lished rule of treaty interpretation incorporated in Article 31 of the
VCLT. Today, the 1989 "Improvements to the GATT dispute settle-
ments rules and procedures ' 2 1 9 have put a right to a Panel beyond
doubt, 220 and thus impliedly the right to a procedure in which the
impartiality of the panelists, the procedural equality of the parties and
a full and fair hearing is guaranteed, at least if so required by one of
218. It is no proof to the contrary that the Contracting Parties have always moved very
cautiously in politically charged disputes. In several such controversies, none of the parties in-
volved have attempted to initiate a formal dispute settlement procedure. This is certainly an
indication that in those and other circumstances Contracting Parties might deem it wiser to
refrain from the particular "judicial process" provided by GATT; it should not be assumed,
however, that the GATT dispute settlement procedure is not suited for "political disputes." See
0. LONG, supra note 191, at 82. In 1982, for example, the United States suspended MFN treat-
ment with Poland. The United States took the position that while political motivation of its
actions could not be excluded, it had only taken advantage of its rights under Poland's Protocol
of Accession. The protocol's § 7 allows a Contracting Party to suspend the application of conces-
sions or other GATT obligations if Poland did not honor certain commitments, which Poland
subsequently failed to meet. No attempt was made to examine the legality of U.S. actions in an
article XXIII proceding.
219. 1989 Decision, supra note 194.
220. "If the complaining party so requests, a decision to establish a panel or working party
shall be taken at the latest at the Council meeting following that at which the request first ap-
peared . . . on the Council's regular agenda .... Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
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the parties concerned. These minimum requirements would not be
met if an adversely affected party's claim of a GATT violation or nulli-
fication and impairment of benefits under GATT could be blocked by
simply invoking article XXI. The only proper way to reconcile the
right to a Panel and article XXI is to review actions allegedly covered
by the security exception according to the lenient standard described.
H. Articles XXIII and XXI Applied
A persistent theme of the first and second reports dealing with arti-
cle XXI was the "invocation" of this provision as a prerequisite for its
being considered in the legal evaluation of a case. However, by refus-
ing to find the U.S. embargo compatible with GATT, the second perti-
nent report revealed the appropriate understanding that article XXI is
a substantive parameter to be observed in any matter in which compli-
ance with GATT is an issue.
The text of article XXI(b)(iii) makes clear that it provides not just
an "exception" in the literal sense, but demands that due account be
taken of its content when "construing" all GATT provisions relevant
to a specific case. Thus, a Panel would have to examine ex officio, and
not only after invocation, the impact of the security exception on any
GATT provision possibly violated by a Contracting Party. There are
a few Panel reports which state a contrary view. A recent Panel 221
tried to base its pertinent handling of a case on GATT precedents. It
will be recalled that there is no such thing as precedent in a technical
sense in international law and certainly not in GATT. These reports
in question give no reason whatsoever for their reading of the text and
have no persuasive value. This is not to say that a party to a GATT
dispute when answering an alleged violation should not have the bur-
den of invoking the particular exception on which it wants to base its
argument in order to facilitate prompt and accurate assessment of the
dispute. But it should not be the case that its failure to argue the point
forecloses the right of the Panel to consider it in its decision. This is
particularly true for "exceptions" like article XXI which constitute
material exemptions from a more general rule.
I. Burden of Proof and of Production
In both Nicaragua Panel reports, the pertinent facts for starting an
evaluation of article XXI(b)(iii) were known to the Panel. This is
doubtlessly so in the second case; in the first case too, the United
221. EEC - Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, GATT Doc. L/6657 (Mar. 22,
1990), at 71.
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States had left no doubt that it had taken the measures in question for
noneconomic reasons and for political purposes. This set of circum-
stances should be enough to trigger an examination of article
XXI(b)(iii). However, what if a party complained against in a Panel
procedure would refuse to provide further information - how would
a Panel have to proceed?
The proper answer to this question depends on the different stages
of Panel examination. In order to trigger article XXI(b)(iii) analysis,
it suffices that political and security reasons are involved. For the ac-
tual legal evaluation by the Panel, of course, a higher degree of infor-
mation is required. It has been set forth above that the security
exception grants the State acting for security purposes vast discretion.
Thus the Panel initially needs little additional information; only the
factual foundation for the objective prerequisites listed under (i)-(iii)
would have to be presented. In case of article XXI(b)(iii), this requires
obviously more than in the case of, say, article XXI(b)(i). In addition,
the State complained against would have to show that it acted for the
protection of its essential security interests. The complaining party
would then have the burden of producing and eventually proving facts
supporting the contrary view. If a State claimed the benefit of article
XXI(b)(iii) without giving any further information, the Panel and the
CONTRACTING PARTIES would have to make every effort to ful-
fill their duty to obtain a suitable factual basis for the determination of
legality. In case these efforts would prove fruitless, the State refusing
full participation would have to bear the disadvantage arising out of
such omission and lose its protection provided by article XXI.
J. Nullification and Impairment Despite Coverage
by Article XXI(b)(iii)?
Finally, the question arises whether a Panel would be entitled to
continue its examination of article XXIII if it had found that the State
against whom the complaint had been brought had acted duly under
the coverage of article XXI(b)(iii). Ordinarily the legality of a mea-
sure is not an indication that a procedure under article XXIII will not
lead to the success of the complaint for other reasons; as will be recal-
led, several Panel reports have based their conclusions on the concept
of protection of reasonable expectations of the complaining party.
There is no room for such an approach when article XXI is involved;
nothing in the General Agreement is supposed to prevent a State from
taking measures which meet the standard of article XXI(b)(iii). The
threat of possible compensation interferes with the enjoyment of free-
dom from limitations specific to GATT if (and only if) the standard of
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article XXI is met. More importantly, an examination of the "reason-
able expectations" of the Contracting Parties almost necessarily leads
to the examination of the "appropriateness" of the measures in ques-
tion. The security exception, however, serves the very purpose of ex-
empting a Contracting Party from that kind of scrutiny. The full
scope of an article XXIII examination would disregard this purpose.
For the same reasons, it is not compatible with article XXI(b) for a
panel to start sua sponte with a review of nullification and impairment
of benefits accrued under GATT, notwithstanding a legal assessment
of the complaint, whenever the facts suggesting an article XXI case
are manifest. Therefore, the broad concept of "nullification and im-
pairment" under article XXIII cannot apply in disputes where an ac-
tion under article XXI is at stake.
IX. PROPOSED CHANGES FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF
ARTICLE XXI(B)(uII)
Obviously, the Contracting Parties to GATT do want a security
exception which allows them to keep an effective tool for enforcing
their legal position in times of political and military tensions. At the
same time, efforts like the Uruguay Round demonstrate the will, in
particular of the United States and the European Community, to
strengthen the legal basis of the GATT System. The analysis of this
article suggests that the law of the existing article XXI(b)(iii), properly
interpreted, provides a workable solution for reconciling these two
conflicting goals: it would allow considerable flexibility, while putting
up some barriers to the unrestricted use of economic coercion for
political purposes.
In times of war or breach of any international obligation endanger-
ing the political-military security of a country, that State may in es-
sence act as if it were only subject to general international law, in
particular, without being restrained by MFN obligations. In all other
situations, where a State not bound by GATT could use economic co-
ercion basically at will without acting illegally, a Contracting Party
has to pay a price for its rights under the Agreement: the limited
choice of action to respond to political challenges not touching essen-
tial security interests and not constituting an international wrongful
act. These cases have to be handled with the use of counter-measures
not infringing the General Agreement. Given GATT's status as "the
constitution of world trade," this restraint on State action seems not
too high a price. For it is self-evident that even the temporary neglect
of basic rules in times of distress leads to a substantially diminished
credibility of the overall framework.
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X. PROPOSED CHANGES FOR THE PROCEDURAL LAW OF
ARTICLE XXI(B)(III)
One of the prime goals of the Uruguay Round is a strengthening of
the GATT dispute settlement procedure. That there is indeed a con-
siderable political push behind this declared goal is demonstrated by
the provisional changes initiated by the Montreal Midterm Review.
The procedural administration of article XXI(b)(iii) could demon-
strate the extent to which major players in GATT like the European
Community and the United States are prepared to accept legal bonds
necessary for the GATT system to change its character from an inter-
state framework for facilitating trade to a true "constitution" for the
participants in world trade, i.e., both States and individual economic
entities.222 In many aspects international economic law is moving in
that direction. Article XXI(b)(iii) might be, as of now, of limited
acute significance to this strengthening of the rule of law in interna-
tional trade relations. But in many aspects it is a philosophical litmus
test of how the Contracting Parties are prepared to fashion the Gen-
eral Agreement. If one takes their publicly expressed commitment to
a progressive development seriously, the following changes from the
recent practice seem necessary.
A. Duty to State Reasons for Unilateral Departure
from GATT Rules
Although it has been stated above that under the present legal situ-
ation a duty already exists to state reasons for an unilateral departure
from normal GATT rules for political purposes, this duty has not been
adequately reflected in State practice so far. Therefore, it is desirable
that this duty be expressly stated either by decision of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES or through other means. The proposition of
this study - that the interest of States in having a varied arsenal of
options for self-enforcement of international law must be balanced
with the need for stability in treaty relationships - determines how
far this duty goes. The following scheme might thus state this legal
appraisal: (1) a State acting under Article XXI(b)(iii) has the duty to
notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and every State concerned, in
particular the State targeted by the pertinent action, of its reliance on
that provision; (2) the notification must substantiate that the State act-
ing has done so for security purposes, and not for economic reasons;
222. See Hilf, International Trade Disputes and the Individual: Private Party Involvement in
National and International Procedures Regarding Unfair Foreign Trade Practices, in 41 Aus-
SENWIRTSCHAFT (SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR INTERNATIONALE HANDELSBEZIE-
HUNGEN) 441 (1985); see also J. JACKSON, supra note 3, at 109.
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and (3) the notification has to comprise such factual elements as may
be required to show that the State acting either is at war or has a
reasonable belief that it is at war; is supporting a party at war; or that
the State targeted with the action has committed an international
wrongful act either against the Contracting Party acting or against
another party which the acting State is supporting.
B. Dispute Settlement Procedure
Under the present (permanent) 223 system, Panels may only ex-
amine the legality of a measure to the extent the terms of reference
allow them to do so. Although in practice the wording has been stan-
dardized, terms of reference set forth in each case are a veritable "com-
promis" which needs the blessing of both of the parties involved in the
dispute. On the other hand, it is a matter of fact that the GATT dis-
pute settlement procedure has developed into one of, if not the most
successful international dispute settlement procedure. 224 A very good
case for this success can be attributed to the "voluntary" character of
the procedure: political peer pressure has convinced many reluctant
States to submit themselves to the burden of a participation in the
process, allowing them to save face due to the true or pretended volun-
tary character of their submission; chances are that they would have
walked away if pushed by a mandatory system.
Yet, in the second case concerning Nicaragua the terms of refer-
ence made the whole procedure turn into a farce. In effect the Panel
itself alluded to the fact that in so doing the "adversely affected con-
tracting party's right to have its complaint investigated in accordance
with Article XXIII:2" had been effectively reduced to the political
process of discussing the matter in the Council to the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. In fact, the formulation chosen by the Re-
port implies somewhat that a Contracting Party has a right to an
effective Panel; a position which at the time of decision was still not
accepted, although even then the practice of almost 40 years of refer-
ring contentious matters to Panels225 might have created such a legal
223. The changes outlined in the 1989 Decision, supra note 194, are dejure of a provisional
character.
224. Save of course the European Court of Justice, which is, however, not a completely fit-
ting object of comparison because of its structure and legal foundation.
225. The first Panel delivered its report in the Belgian Family Allowance case. CON-
TRACTING PARTIES TO THE GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, Supp.
No. 1 (1953), at 59 (Report of Nov. 7, 1952); Supp. No. 2 (1954), at 18 (Recommendation of
Nov. 7, 1952); Supp. No. 7 (1959), at 68 (Outcome of earlier complaints); and Final Report by the
Government of Belgium GATT Doc. L/187 (Mar. 22, 1954). From the beginning of the 1960s on,
almost every matter was referred to a Panel, if so requested.
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right.226 In fact, the development initiated by the Montreal Midterm
Review points in that direction when it fosters "institutionalized jus-
tice" by "standard terms of reference" and other devices.
227
An effective procedural administration of article XXI(b)(iii) would
require that the terms of reference for Panels be standardized along
these lines and subject only to change by agreement of the parties in-
volved. 228 Furthermore, the interpretation of article XXI is not, as
has been set forth above, "reserved entirely to the contracting party
invoking it." The Panel itself would have to examine this provision,
sua sponte if necessary, in every matter, in order "to ensure that this
general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is
not invoked excessively or for purpose other than those set out in this
provision." 229
In a matter in which article XXI turns out to be relevant, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES should make clear that it is up to the
party acting under that provision to show initially that it has not
abused its right. This process of clarification would be particularly
helpful with a dispute settlement procedure having developed more
"judicial" characteristics; however, even if the presently existing sys-
tem remains in place, it would be useful to remind the Contracting
Parties of the general principle that a party who relies upon an excep-
tion to a general rule has the burden of showing that its prerequisites
are met.
226. See the 1989 Decision, supra note 194.
227. See Canal-Forgues & Ostrihansky, New Developments in the GA TT Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 24 J. WORLD TRADE L. 67 (1990).
228. The 1989 Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, supra note 194, adopts that
solution on a provisional basis.
229. Id.
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